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OPERATIONALIZING THE HEALTH
CARE BENEFIT CORPORATION
TERRY L. CORBETT, MHSA, MBA, JD, LLM, SJD*
ABSTRACT
This is the third in a series of articles discussing a proposed new form of
legal entity which we have called a “Health Care Benefit Corporation”
(“HCBC”) – a variant form of the hybrid “benefit corporation” first proposed by
the non-profit organization B Lab. Unlike B Lab’s “Model Act” form of benefit
corporation, the HCBC would be specifically tailored to best meet the needs of
institutional health care providers and integrated health care delivery systems.
As such, it would differ in several significant ways from the B Lab Model, as
well as from all current state adaptations thereof. It is proposed as a new
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corporate form that would be particularly useful to those wishing to develop and
operate “Accountable Care Organizations” (“ACOs”).
In our first article, in 2015, we explored the evolution of American hospitals
into only two predominate forms of legal organization – for-profit and nonprofit
corporations. We compared and contrasted the characteristics and performance
of hospitals under each of the two corporate forms and analyzed the implications
of recent developments in both heath law (e.g., the “Affordable Care Act”
(“ACA”) and the proposed “Fiduciary Medicine Model” and corporate law (e.g.,
the proposed “doctrine of mission primacy”). We concluded with a call for a
“new organizational paradigm” – the HCBC.
In our second article, in 2019, we delved more deeply into the theoretical
underpinnings of the corporation as a legal construct – its governance, existential
nature, and social/moral dimensions. We examined several new concepts
preceding the benefit corporation, including “corporate social responsibility,”
“social entrepreneurship/social enterprise,” and “constituency statutes.” We then
fully “fleshed out” the structure of our proposed HCBC and explained how its
specifically-tailored features could benefit institutional health care providers.
Now, in this article, we identify and discuss five objectives for
operationalizing the HCBC, focusing on: (1) integrated systems, health
information technology, and clinical practice guidelines; (2) adoption of
exclusive enterprise liability and acknowledgement of broadened fiduciary
duties; (3) cost-reductions through liability self-insurance; (4) operating as both
a non-capitated provider and nonprofit payer; and (5) creating a “culture of
virtue” that sustains the professional integrity of institutional health care delivery
and restores patient trust.
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FOREWARD1
I have never been convinced that competition by itself will improve
the efficiency or the effectiveness of care or even that it will reduce
the cost of care. I think that commercialization of care is a big
mistake. Health care is a sacred mission. It is a moral enterprise and
a scientific enterprise but not fundamentally a commercial one. We
are not selling a product. We don’t have a consumer who understands

1. Throughout this article, all internal footnotes in quoted material have been omitted.
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everything and makes rational choices – and I include myself here.
Doctors and nurses are stewards of something precious. Their work
is a kind of vocation rather than simply a job; commercial values don’t
really capture what they do for patients and for society as a whole.
Systems awareness and systems design are important for health
professionals but are not enough. They are enabling mechanisms
only. It is the ethical dimension of individuals that is essential to a
system’s success. Ultimately, the secret of quality is love. You have
to love your patient, you have to love your profession, you have to
love your God. If you have love, you can then work backward to
monitor and improve the system. Commercialism should not be a
principal force in the system. That people should make money by
investing in health care without actually being providers of health care
seems somewhat perverse, like a kind of racketeering.
Avedis Donabedian 2
I. INTRODUCTION
In a 2015 article,3 we undertook to examine how the organization and
operation of modern American hospitals affects, and is affected by, their initiallyselected form of legal entity. We began with a detailed review of the history and
evolution of such hospitals from their early beginnings as “donation-supported
‘alms houses’”4 to their current status as large, institutional direct providers of
care in the “Medical-Industrial Complex.”5 We noted how the advent of health
insurance and other third-party payment contributed greatly to the everincreasing commercialization and capitalization of health care services, and the
subsequent bifurcation of essentially all contemporary hospitals into one of only
two legal forms of organization – for-profit corporations and nonprofit
corporations.6 We then reviewed available research into the comparative
characteristics and performance of these two corporate forms.7 We concluded,
ultimately, that despite the legal features and requirements historically

2. Fitzhugh Mullan, A Founder of Quality Assessment Encounters A Troubled System Firsthand,
20 HEALTH AFFS. 5 (2001) (quoting an interview with Avedis Donabedian).
3. Terry L. Corbett, Healthcare Corporate Structure and the ACA: A Need For Mission Primacy
Through a New Organizational Paradigm?, 12 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 103, 172 (2015).
4. Id. at 109.
5. Id. at 116–118.
6. Id. at 122–24.
7. Id. at 126–30.
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distinguishing the two types of corporations,8 their operational differences now
increasingly appear to be only nominal.
We then shifted focus to the still-continuing debate over the
“deontological” nature of health care in the United States – that is, whether it is
generally viewed and treated as a simple commodity, a public good, or a basic
right of all citizens.9 The answer to this question, we believe, necessarily informs
one’s opinion about which corporate form better serves the needs and objectives
of our current health care delivery system.10 That system, regrettably, has been
under attack for several years for well-documented deficiencies in quality, value,
efficiency, and accountability – all problems that the 2010 Affordable Care Act
(“ACA”) sought to address.11 Accordingly, we next reviewed and discussed
several provisions of the ACA that directly address these deficiencies, and tried
to assess how those efforts would impact, and be impacted by, a hospital’s choice
of corporate form.12 One ACA provision in particular stood out – the law’s
encouragement that Accountable Care Organizations (“ACOs”) be developed.13
From there, we brought three additional academic theses into our analysis:
(1) the concept of “mission primacy,”14 (2) newly-developed “hybrid legal
structures,”15 and (3) a recently-proposed “Fiduciary Medicine Model.”16
8. Id. at 103. That is to say, “nonprofit hospitals provide care ostensibly in order to maximize the
public good; for-profit hospitals provide care as a means to maximize owner profit. Over time,
however, developments in medical science, technology, and business economics have resulted in
increased commercialization of both organizational forms, blurring these traditional distinctions.” Id.
9. Id. at 137.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 157–58.
12. Id.
13. Id. at 159 (“ACOs are among the key strategies under the ACA to improve quality and lower
cost by promoting organizational structures that will coordinate and integrate the care provided by
different service providers in various settings.”).
14. Id. at 166 (citing Thomas L. Greaney & Kathleen M. Boozang, Mission, Margin, and Trust in
the Nonprofit Health Care Enterprise, 5 YALE J. HEALTH POL’Y, L. & ETHICS 1 (2005)). “Some have
argued that the concept of ‘mission primacy’ – a ‘doctrinal recognition’ that a corporation’s ‘articulated
mission’ should be its legally-enforceable primary objective (as is profit-maximization for a for-profit
corporation) – should be more strictly applied to tax-exempt, nonprofit health care corporations in order
to better ensure director fidelity to the organizations’ charitable missions.” Id.
15. Id. at 168–70 (“[T]hese entities ‘tread [] against the very essence of the for-profit motive’ by
defining stakeholder benefit as the primary purpose of the organization, in contravention of which the
organization may not act.”); see also id. at 169 (citing generally Christen Clarke, California’s Flexible
Purpose Corporation: A Step Forward, A Step Back, Or No Step At All?, 5 J. BUS. ENTREPRENEURSHIP
& L. 301, 307–09 (2013). We described “the three most currently-prominent forms of hybrid legal
structures: the ‘Flexible Purpose Corporation,’ the ‘Low-Profit Limited Liability Company,’ and the
‘Benefit Corporation.’” Id. at 170.
16. This was proposed by Dayna B. Matthew, Vice Dean and Professor of Law at the University of
Colorado Law School. Matthew’s model embodies a new legal paradigm that she asserts is best suited
to ‘implementing and achieving the goals of the ACA’ – ‘to universalize access to health care,’ while
reshaping the private and public financing markets ‘and the organizational entities that deliver and
control the quality’ of health care services. The basic idea is to extend those fiduciary obligations (i.e.,
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Integrating these ideas into our assessment of the current state of the American
health care delivery system, the objectives of the ACA, and the particular
potential of ACOs, we concluded our article with a call for creation of a “new
organizational paradigm” – a specific form of benefit corporation which we
termed a “Health Care Benefit Corporation” (“HCBC”) – the details of which
remained, at that time, to be fully explicated.
Subsequently, in a 2019 article, we attempted to “flesh out” those details.17
We began by discussing the evolution of the concept of corporations and their
governance, focusing more intensely on: the longstanding “shareholderstakeholder debate;” the three traditional theories of the “existential nature” of
the corporation itself (i.e., the Fiction, Aggregate and Real Entity views); and,
the (previously-noted) bifurcation of American corporations into for-profit and
nonprofit forms. This background prompted us to question the “social and moral
dimensions of the modern corporation,” which in turn led us directly to the
(relatively) new conceptual constructs of “corporate social responsibility,”
“social entrepreneurship/social enterprise,” “constituency statutes,” and lastly
the “benefit corporation.”18 We then undertook a more comprehensive
examination of the proposed benefit corporation – the rationale behind it, its
founders,19 its continuing development, and its current status. We identified the
fundamentals of the “Model Act” promulgated and promoted by its B Lab
originators and reviewed several criticisms made by detractors of the Act.
Importantly, we described several recent state “adaptations” of the Model Act,
some of which we concluded would more suitably serve as prototypes for our
proposed HCBC.20
good faith, loyalty, and due care) that are already well-established in the profession of medicine ‘to all
major participants in the health care industry’ who are involved in the direct delivery of health care
services to patients. Id. at 177 (citing generally Dayna B. Matthew, Implementing American Health Care
Reform: The Fiduciary Imperative, 59 BUFF. L. REV. 715, 744–45 (2011)).
17. Terry L. Corbett, The Case For A Health Care Benefit Corporation, 47 CAP. U. L. REV. 183,
189 (2019).
18. Id.
19. See id. at 187 n.3 (“The Benefit Corporation began as a ‘project of the non-profit organization
B Lab.’ A white paper discussing the need and rationale for model legislation (and containing the model
legislation itself) was drafted by principal authors William H. Clark, Jr., of Drinker, Biddle, & Reath
LLP and Larry Vranka of Canonchet Group LLC.”).
20. We would here note that some other authors have recently called for health care companies to
become benefit corporations. In an article published roughly the same time as our own in 2019,
Professors Heled, Vertinsky and Brewer wrote:
In this Article, we suggest that a change in corporate form can be used to more closely align
private incentives with public need by changing corporate incentives from the inside. We
propose that companies involved in the provision of healthcare products and services should
be encouraged or even required to assume alternative business forms that would both enable
and require them to consider the needs of a broader range of stakeholders and the public interest
in addition to shareholder value. We identify benefit corporations, broadly defined, as one
preferred mechanism for achieving this. We conclude that this approach could help to change
corporate behavior in ways that improve healthcare outcomes.
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Next, we returned our focus to the health care delivery system. We
elaborated further on the “deontology” of American health care as a prelude to
discussing the apparent growing need for greater “social responsibility” in the
provision of health care services.21 We identified the broadly-acknowledged
continuing “drivers” of recent efforts to reform the delivery system (i.e.,
escalating cost, system fragmentation, and compromised quality) and described
four examples of ongoing reform initiatives that promote ever-increasing
“system integration” – Hospitalist Programs, Clinical Co-Management, PatientCentered Medical Homes, and Provider Clinical Integration.22 We then
expanded upon our earlier discussions of Accountable Care and the ACOs that
are now hoped “to integrate, coordinate, and eventually finance the delivery of
health care services” under the ACA.23 Further, we delved more deeply into the
topics of mission primacy and fiduciary duty, and included some additional
discussion on the related issue of “medical trust.” Finally, we explained our
“proposed HCBC legal structure in far-greater detail than our initial article,
explaining the specific features necessary for it to provide a viable and preferred

Yaniv Heled; Lisa Vertinsky; Cass Brewer, Why Healthcare Companies Should (Be)Come Benefit
Corporations, 60 B.C.L.REV. 73, 74 (2019). These authors go on to say:
For purposes of this Article, we define ‘healthcare companies’ as for-profit business entities
involved in the commercial development, manufacture, or distribution of healthcare products
and services. Healthcare companies may include pharmaceutical companies and other
developers of biomedical technology, distributors and retailers of medical supplies (including
retail pharmacies), medical insurance companies, pharmacy benefit management companies,
laboratories, and so forth. We acknowledge that healthcare markets are complex and operate
in different ways, subject to different constraints, and that these markets are constantly
changing, but we argue that private profit incentives largely explain choices made by
healthcare companies and that a divergence of private and public interests persists across
different parts of the market. Even though we largely focus on for-profit organizations, in
Part III we suggest why in many cases benefit corporations may also be preferable to nonprofit organizations, although we leave a more detailed comparison and analysis for a
separate article.
Id. at n.8. While we agree with many of these authors’ contentions regarding the value and desirability
of benefit corporations generally (be they the Model Act form or various state statutory adaptations
thereof), as well as specifically for what has been called “development-of-care” companies (e.g.,
pharmaceutical companies, medical equipment companies, etc.) and potentially for “financing-of-care”
companies (e.g., health plans and other insurance payers), we remain of the opinion that the Model Act
form of benefit corporation is suboptimal for “delivery-of-care” companies (i.e., institutional health care
providers and integrated delivery systems). See Corbett, supra note 17, at 239–40. As discussed at
length in our 2019 article, such companies would be best served by a “tailored” form of benefit
corporation that has certain specific features: no “general public purpose” requirement, a bifurcated
financial structure, and a legally-mandated singular focus on mission primacy and fiduciary duty. Id. at
321–26. Such features are intended to respond to the unique deontological character of “delivery-ofcare” companies that arises from their inherent ethical (and increasingly, legal) obligations in their
direct, “hands-on” provision of health care services. Id. at 331–35.
21. Corbett, supra note 17, at 244–53.
22. Id. at 255–71.
23. Id. at 190.
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corporate framework for the operation of institutional health care providers.”24
As we then summarized, the HCBC will essentially:
• Be a “membership corporation” utilizing a “shared governance
structure” that includes both organizational and individual members –
likely consisting of individual medical professionals (e.g., doctors,
nurses, technicians), administrative professionals (e.g., managers,
accountants,
lawyers),
community
representatives
(e.g.,
previous/prospective patients, business owners, government
employees), and individual representatives of other relevant and
related company and/or institutional interests (e.g., medical group
practices, medical suppliers, third-party payers, etc.) – who govern a
“clinically (and/or financially) integrated health care delivery system”
through a “self-electing board” of participating “stakeholders;”
• That has a “hybrid” corporate form – comprised of both nonprofit
and for-profit components – reflecting a “bifurcated financial
structure” (based on an a priori “apportionment” of nonprofit and forprofit activities) that effectually limits the amount of “private
inurement” that can occur (and in turn be deemed taxable), thereby
reinforcing a better “calibration” between organizational “mission and
margin;”
• That is committed to the “primacy” of a “dual organizational
mission” – i.e., both the ongoing and consistent provision of
affordable, high-quality, high-value, and readily accessible health care
services and targeted profit seeking and distribution (as necessary to
attract equity investors and management talent, as well as provide
access to taxable capital markets, to ensure the organization’s
financial integrity); and
• That formally recognizes and accepts its “institutional fiduciary
responsibilities” (and corresponding liability) both for the
professional provision of competent health care and for the general
accomplishment of its organizationally-mandated dual missions.25
We concluded with the hope that the HCBC, so structured, could better serve the
legitimate needs and proper interests of the multiple stakeholders in integrated

24. Id.
25. Id. at 336–37.
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delivery systems (particularly ACOs), and help rationalize and restore trust in
the professional culture of medicine.26
Now, in this article, we hope to further advance that objective by suggesting
how the HCBC could:
1. Improve care quality by explicitly embracing the ACA’s integrated
systems approach to a coordinated care model, further facilitating the
development and appropriate use of health information technology
and evidence-based clinical practice guidelines.
2. Enhance fairness and equity for victims of “iatrogenic injury”27 by
adopting an enterprise liability regime that promotes reconstruction of
existing legal standards governing the medical and fiduciary duties
and liabilities of integrated system providers.
3. Significantly reduce overhead costs by self-insuring the
organization against its prospective medical and fiduciary liabilities.
4. Provide a preferred organizational framework for offering a more
cost-efficient, market-competitive private health insurance option
priced at cost to interested enrollees.
5. Create and sustain an organizational “culture of virtue” that upholds
and reinforces medicine’s professional norms and restores patient
trust in today’s institutional health care delivery systems.

26. Id. at 339.
27. Professor Barry R. Furrow observes:
Patients are harmed frequently in hospitals, in as many as one-third of admissions. They die,
suffer surgical injury, become infected, are disabled, are readmitted with problems, lose time
from work, or otherwise experience what patient safety experts call ‘adverse events,’ a term
describing the sometimes lethal byproducts of health care. These patient harms, these adverse
events, happen because of staff errors, system failures of coordination and management, drug
mismanagement, and a hundred other reasons, many of which are discovered after the fact.
Health care institutions injure and kill patients one at a time – unlike cruise ship disasters or
airplane crashes. The casualties are scattered over almost six thousand hospitals, obscuring
the volume of harms that occur. These adverse events come in dozens of forms, caused by a
multiplicity of factors.
Barry R. Furrow, Adverse Events and Patient Injury: Coupling Detection, Disclosure, and
Compensation, 46 NEW ENG. L. REV. 437, 439 (2012) (citing Virginia A. Sharpe & Alan I. Faden,
MEDICAL HARM: HISTORICAL, CONCEPTUAL, AND ETHICAL DIMENSIONS OF IATROGENIC ILLNESS 4
(1998) (defining an “iatrogenic adverse event” as any “complication resulting from reactions to
medication or procedures, physical injury or accident, psychological decompensation, nosocomial
infections, and medical or nursing errors – including errors of omission”) (emphasis added).
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II. THE NEED FOR AN INTEGRATED, COORDINATED, AND EVIDENCE-BASED
CARE MODEL
As of 2016, the United States had more than 6,000 hospitals – 3,000
nonprofit, roughly 1,300 for-profit, around 1,200 government-owned (at either
the federal, state, or local levels), and a remaining few long-term care and
psychiatric hospitals.28 As we noted in our 2015 article:
Generally speaking, the current system has been viewed as
competitive (in an unhelpful way), fragmented, and driven by
counterproductive financial incentives. These features have resulted
in growing concerns over poor quality, spiraling costs, and rising
barriers to access – all issues that have been thoroughly addressed and
documented elsewhere. There is seemingly broad consensus,
professional and academic if not political, that the solution lies with
transition to an ‘integrated and coordinated care model’ that is
predicated upon ‘systems-based care management’ that will
consistently produce efficient, high quality services through greater
collaboration among system participants.29
A.

The Systems Approach

According to Professor P. Greg Gulick, Jr., the term “system” – when
applied to health care – can have two different meanings: first, when applied in
a “macro” or “national-level” sense, it can mean an aggregation of the taxonomy
of companies30 that comprise the entirely of the broad health care sector and the
patients it serves;31 second, when applied in a “micro” or “delivery-level” sense,
it can also properly describe that which we are in fact here focusing on – an
aggregation of direct, hands-on providers (e.g., hospitals, physicians, therapists,
laboratories, etc.) operating as an integrated delivery system (e.g., an ACO).32
Professor Gulick explains how “General Systems Theory” derives from the
1940s’ work of biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy:
[G]eneral System[s] Theory stands for the premise that ‘it is necessary
to study not only parts and processes in isolation, but also to solve the
decisive problems found in the organization and order unifying them,

28. Barry R. Furrow, The Limits of Current A.I. in Health Care: Patient Safety Policing in
Hospitals, 12 N.E. U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2020).
29. Corbett, supra note 3, at 145–46.
30. That is, “development-of-care” companies, “financing-of-care” companies, and “delivery-ofcare” companies. Corbett, supra note 17, at 239–40.
31. P. Greg Gulick, Jr., A Systems Thinking Approach to Health Care Reform in the United States,
21 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 1, 1–2 (2019).
32. Id.
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resulting from dynamic interactions of parts, and making the behavior
of parts different when studied in isolation or within the whole.’
General System Theory recognizes that an imbalance in one part of a
system throws the entire system out of balance, so the whole system
must be taken into consideration when studying, investigating or
reforming the system.33
He then describes how application of General Systems Theory over time in the
fields of sociology and organizational behavior “has inspired theories such as
‘Systems Thinking,’ which encourages a holistic view of other types of complex
systems.”34 Systems Thinking, he says, “is ‘an approach to problem solving that
views ‘problems’ as part of a wider, dynamic system.’”35 He goes on to suggest
that much of the failure of health care reform efforts to date is due to a too-narrow
focus on “a particular bad act, or agent, or even a particular subsystem,” rather
than on the system as a complex whole.36
Lastly, Professor Gulick distinguishes a “complex system” from a
“complex adaptive system” 37 and opines that the entire U.S. health care system
is a complex adaptive system,38 which he then characterizes:
33. Id. at 64 n.7–8 (citing LUDWIG VON BERTALANFFY, GENERAL SYSTEMS THEORY:
FOUNDATIONS, DEVELOPMENT, APPLICATIONS (George Braziller ed., New York 1968)).
34. Id. at 2–3.
35. Id. at 3.
36. Id.
37. He explains the difference as follows:
A complex system is ‘one in which the whole is different from the sum of its parts.’ This can
be understood by contemplating a chemical reaction in which the characteristics of the
substances that are mixed together differ considerably from the resulting compound. Nonlinear
systems are always complex. Complex systems form organically from interactions between
the various agents within the system and the reactions to these interactions. Complex systems
that exhibit the tendency to be self-organizing, the existence of emergent properties, sensitivity
to initial conditions, and resistance to change are referred to as complex adaptive systems. The
defining characteristic of a complex adaptive system is the ability of the agents within the
system to receive feedback from external and internal sources and learn from, or adapt to, this
feedback. Complex systems are generally composed of other related complex subsystems,
which are composed of interrelated and interdependent agents, ‘for which the degree and
nature of their relationships is imperfectly known.’
Id. at 13 (emphasis added).
38. The U.S. health care system is not just a complex system, but it is a complex adaptive
system. A complex adaptive system is ‘a collection of individual agents with freedom to act in
ways that are not always totally predictable, and whose actions are interconnected so that one
agent’s actions changes the context for other agents.’ In addition to being non-linear, selforganizing, and governed by feedback, complex adaptive systems also share the following
characteristics: they are constantly changing, tightly linked, history dependent, counterintuitive, and resistant to change. Although every complex adaptive system is unique they all
exhibit four characteristics, complex adaptive systems are: dynamic, massively entangled,
robust, and emergent, (or self-organizing). As will be demonstrated . . . , complex adaptive
systems like the U.S. health care system, exhibit all four of these characteristics.
Id. at 13–14.
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On the national-level, the U.S. health care system has never been
referred to as a ‘well-oiled machine.’ There are many welldocumented and discussed challenges with the U.S. health care
system, including high-costs, difficulty accessing care, and problems
with over and under-utilization (and related quality of care issues).
There are so many different parts and incentives and causative
pathways that thinking of the U.S. health care system as a ‘system’
analogous to a ‘machine’ is the wrong characterization in the first
place. Instead, the U.S. health care system should be viewed as a
complex [adaptive] system, which is more analogous to a ‘living
organism’ with an interrelationship and interdependency between the
parts. This re-characterization of the U.S. health care system as a
living organism rather than a machine has implications for health care
reform. Instead of simply reforming one aspect of the system
(repairing a part of the machine), it is necessary to consider a holistic
reform that will impact the entire system.39
1.

Who, Exactly, is Taking Care of Me?

Simply put, while we may be said to have a “complex adaptive system” of
health care delivery in this country (at both the macro and micro levels), we
remain far from having an “integrated and coordinated care model” that operates
at any level to consistently provide high-quality services that are cost-efficient
and readily-accessible. Many believe that the fundamental problem continues to
be insufficient communication, coordination, and collaboration among our
“fragmented” system participants.40 For example, health care writer Atul
Gawande has gone so far as to liken the inefficient way that we deliver health
care services to one’s foregoing use of a general contractor “to assemble and
supervise a team” when remodeling a home – choosing instead to hire individual
tradesmen and paying them for their piecework.41 Professor William M. Sage
makes an analogous point:
[T]his Article posits that prices for health care are too high, quality
too unreliable, and innovation too limited in large part because we
have been buying and selling the wrong things. In other complex
economic sectors, consumers purchase assembled products from
39. Id. at 3–4.
40. In our 2019 article, we spend considerable time discussing system fragmentation as one of the
“three principal and closely-interrelated drivers of health care reform” (along with cost and quality). See
Corbett, supra note 17, at 255–62.
41. Id. at 259 (first quoting Elizabeth L. Rowe, Accountable Care Organizations: How Antitrust
Law Impacts the Evolving Landscape of Health Care, 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 1855, 1869–70 (2012); and
then citing Atul Gawande, The Cost Conundrum: What a Texas Town Can Teach Us About Health Care,
NEW YORKER, June 1, 2009, at 36)).
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which they expect concrete, demonstrable benefits. Producers
aggressively manage their supply chains, product performance can be
measured, and products can be warranted for safety and effectiveness.
In health care, by contrast, most consumers purchase only isolated
process steps and components.
Physicians strive to deliver
reimbursable relative value units (RVUs), not definitive treatment
packages. Hospitals coproduce care in vague collaboration with
physicians and often have limited leverage over expensive inputs such
as medical devices. This causes the health care we receive to be
shoddily put together, overly costly to produce, insufficiently
responsive to consumers’ needs, and difficult to monitor for quality.42
Professor Sage goes on to suggest that today’s institutionally-provided
health care “emphasizes incomplete process steps and isolated components
rather than assembled products.”43 While individual physicians still perform
certain personal tasks for their patients, most everything else they “order” for
their patients – that is, drugs, diagnostic tests, therapeutic services, routine
nursing care, evaluation by additional specialists – all are provided by other
health care professionals.44 Each of these professionals, in turn, similarly call
upon others for further discrete inputs, too often resulting in an aggregate service
experience for the patient that is unstructured and lacking in clinical cohesion.45
The presence of health insurance and other sources of third-party payment only
exacerbates the situation by “aggregating professional process steps and other
traditional care components and inputs into assemblages [for payment purposes]
that appear coherent but remain disconnected from the efficient solution of
complex medical problems.”46
Nonetheless, “[t]o a surprising degree, even highly sophisticated medical
services are still conceptualized as extensions of an individual doctor’s
traditional black bag and prescription pad.”47 The only part of this
“individualistic paradigm” that actually persists in today’s health care reality,
however, is “the strength of the therapeutic bond between a patient and the
individual[s] that patient perceives as his or her expert caregiver[s].”48
Increasingly, that caregiver is some other professional, some variably-trained

42. William M. Sage, Assembled Products: The Key to More Effective Competition and Antitrust
Oversight in Health Care, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 609, 613 (2016).
43. Id. at 619.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 630.
47. Id. at 618.
48. Id. at 619.
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paraprofessional, or (more often) one or more ad hoc health care “teams” which
too-often lack effective cohesion.49
2.

The Implications of Today’s “Team” Health Care

It is important to note that medical teams are often formed temporarily
from various sources for single episodes of care. Some who become
part of the team for a given episode may be independent contractors
rather than employees of the healthcare facility where care is
provided. Physicians in a particular medical practice may furnish
services as team members in a number of diverse contexts. The
members of these teams, however, are rarely trained together. They
also may come from different disciplines and educational
backgrounds. Further, team training in the medical profession tends
to be limited and insufficiently grounded in a scientific understanding
of the human factors that influence effective teamwork. It may also
be haphazard. For example, physicians frequently do not have a good
grasp of how hospitals function.50
The fact is, and for some time has been, that health care today “requires the
coordinated participation of many individuals with different skills and training
in one or more settings with advanced physical plants, fixed technologies,
consumable supplies, and information resources.”51 It is for this reason that ad
hoc teams have evolved somewhat spontaneously in response to our complex
adaptive system of health care delivery. However, this expectable response to
system complexity has also created increased opportunity for multiple factors to
contribute, in inadvertent concert, to medical error.52 Recognition of this fact
has emphasized the need for what has been variously called “root cause” or
“contributing factors” analysis when such errors occur:
In more complex systems settings, there are almost always multiple
factors contributing to mistakes. No one of these factors alone is the
root cause. Errors are a function of natural weaknesses in human
cognition and behavior (human factors) interacting with systems
errors (latent errors), with the result that any well-intentioned
professional who is placed in a poorly designed system is likely to
commit an error. Hence, in these settings RCA [Root Cause Analysis]

49. See John R. Grout et al., Mistake-Proofing Medicine: Legal Consideration and Healthcare
Quality Implications, 14 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 387, 402 (2013) (describing the formation of teams in
the medical care setting and lack of team training).
50. Id. at 402.
51. Sage, supra note 42, at 619.
52. See Grout et al., supra note 49, at 402–03 (noting the association between lack of team
coordination and higher rates of adverse events for patients in hospital settings).
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might be better termed ‘contributing factors analysis.’ Contributing
factors include such influences as management decisions,
organizational processes, work conditions, workload, supervision,
knowledge, ability, and barriers.53
It has been noted that one of the best ways to deal with such “medical
failings” is to “redesign both the organization of and the equipment used by the
medical team” as and when necessary – and that it increasingly is the hospital (or
other institutional provider) which is in the best “strategic position” to do so.54
The question remains, however, who is ultimately accountable and legally liable
for the patient’s individual experience when such medical failings result in a bad
outcome?
Professor Elliott Fisher – generally credited with “first introducing the
modern ACO concept”55 – spoke to this question in a 2006 article discussing the
continuing need for quality improvement and cost control:
A distinguishing feature of many of these efforts, however, is their
focus on the individual provider as the locus of both performance
assessment and accountability. This focus reflects the historical
development, oversight mechanisms, and payment systems that
prevail in the U.S. health care system and the interest of providers to
be held accountable only for care that is within their direct control.
The limitations of this approach are increasingly apparent. The
provision of high quality care for any serious illness requires
coordinated, longitudinal care and the engagement of multiple
professionals across different institutional settings. Also, many of the
most serious gaps in quality can be attributed to poor coordination and
faulty transitions. For these reasons, a recent Institute of Medicine

53. Id. at 420.
54. See Kenneth S. Abraham & Paul C. Weiler, Enterprise Medical Liability and the Evolution of
the American Health Care System, 108 HARV. L. REV. 381, 413 (1994). The authors explain why such
redesign is often necessary:
[T]he inevitable human frailty of individual physicians and the undeniable effectiveness of
‘team’ approaches to reducing patient injury point to the health care enterprise as the most
effective mechanism for addressing medical malpractice. The truth is that the individual
physician is now typically a member – admittedly a crucial member – of a larger team of
medical personnel, all of whom have their own special training and responsibilities for the
course of treatment of the same patient. One of the important ways in which things sometimes
go wrong within such medical teams is through failures of communication among the
physicians, clinicians, nurses, and other staff members (for example, about a patient’s earlier
adverse reaction to a particular drug).
Id.
55. Corbett, supra note 17, at 272.
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(IOM) report called for efforts to foster shared accountability among
all providers for the quality and cost of care.56
We will further discuss this idea of “shared accountability” in later
sections;57 for now, let us next examine some particular developments that are
impacting team health care.
a.

Health Information Technology, Data Analytics, and Artificial
Intelligence

The Institute of Medicine report, To Err Is Human (IOM Report),
published in 1998, estimated a maximum of 100,000 patient deaths
annually occurred due to medical errors. The IOM Report with its
extrapolation of high levels of patient harms – ‘spurred the
development of the Patient Safety Movement, which intensified the
search for adverse events and means of preventing them.’
Three years later the IOM published Crossing the Quality Chasm: A
New Health System for the 21st Century, which stressed the
importance of health care systems design. It argued that most errors
and adverse events in health care are caused by problems with system
processes and not provider error. The clear implication is that . . . it
is time to use AI [Artificial Intelligence] to supercharge the tools for
detecting and preventing such errors.58
The communication, coordination, and collaboration necessary for safe and
effective team health care in today’s increasingly complex medical environment
is becoming ever-more dependent on a variety of Health Information
Technologies (“HIT”).59 Central among these technologies available to
institutional health care providers and their developing systems is the Electronic
Medical Record (“EMR”) – sometimes referred to as the Electronic Health

56. Elliott Fisher et al., Creating Accountable Care Organizations: The Extended Hospital Medical
Staff, 26 HEALTH AFF. w44, w45 (2006) (emphasis added).
57. See infra Part III.
58. Furrow, supra note 28, at 19 (emphasis added).
59. See Julianne Sweeney, Healthcare Informatics, 21 ONLINE J. NURSING INFORMATICS 1, 1–2
(2017) (defining healthcare informatics and its proliferation in the healthcare field). It should be noted
that the proliferation of Health Information Technologies over the last three decades has given rise to an
entire academic and professional field of “Healthcare Informatics,” which has been defined as “the
integration of health-care sciences, computer science, information science, and cognitive science to
assist in the management of healthcare information.” Id. (quoting Virginia K. Saba & Kathleen
McCormick eds., ESSENTIALS OF NURSING INFORMATICS 232, 6th ed. 2015)). It is not our purpose here
to delve deeply into this expanding field, but only to examine some of its impacts on system
development for effective team health care.
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Record (“EHR”).60 To maximize their utility, such EMRs must be able “to
integrate information from multiple sources, capture data at the point of
encounter, and support caregiver decision-making.”61 According to the IOM, it
is critical that EMR capabilities include: “clinical documentation, results
management, order entry management, decision support, electronic
communication and connectivity, patient support, administrative process
support, and population health reporting.”62
Despite the “existing and evolving capabilities inherent in advanced EMR
technology,” some have described our health care system as remaining
‘“arguably the world’s largest, most inefficient information enterprise.”‘63 They
see the technology’s potential for reducing medical malpractice going “largely
unrealized” due to continuing poor communication and “a lack of understanding
of patterns of error resulting from shared information,” rather than from “purely
individual human mistakes.”64 Acknowledging that even the best of technologies
are no more than sophisticated tools that require proper application and
continuous oversight, several issues continue to present ongoing challenges:
A major issue is deciding who takes responsibility for maintaining and
ensuring that EMRs are up to date, given the necessity of shared
records. Does a physician have a responsibility to act upon
information supplied electronically by a patient and, if so, under what
circumstances?
Which physician, among various physicians
providing care for various ailments, has the responsibility to take
action if one of the other physicians enters evidence indicating a
potential health-threatening issue? Who is responsible for ensuring
patient information is current and correct, and who, if anyone, has the
responsibility for periodically updating the system with current patient
data, reconciling conflicting data, and deciding on the disposition of
information that arrives after a patient is discharged? Which
physician, among various sets of physicians providing care for
specific ailments, has responsibility for taking action if evidence
indicating a potential health-threatening issue is placed in a patient’s
EMR? How far should legal liability extend in a chain of providers?65

60. See John W. Hill et al., Law, Information Technology, and Medical Errors: Toward a National
Healthcare Information Approach to Improving Patient Care and Reducing Malpractice Costs, 2007 U.
ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 159, 195 (2007) (noting the importance of EMRs to the future of health care
systems and their role to support caregiver decision-making).
61. Id.
62. Id. (citing INST. OF MED., KEY CAPABILITIES OF AN ELECTRONIC HEALTH RECORD SYSTEM 7
(2003) (available at http://www.nap.edu/catalog/10781.html)).
63. Id. at 202 (citing Richard Hillestad et al., Can Electronic Medical Record Systems Transform
Healthcare? Potential Health Benefits, Savings, and Costs, 24 HEALTH AFF. 1103, 1103 (2005)).
64. Id.
65. Id. at 213–14 (emphasis added).
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Related to HIT, and in fact further empowered by it to “discover and track
the systematic causes of patient harms,” is the science of “data analytics.”66
Investigation of “iatrogenic injury”67 used to be “focused on the individual
physician as the primary causal agent of patient harm.”68 Today, the focus has
shifted to the hospitals themselves and other direct organizational providers –
“the complex institutions where most high-risk care is now delivered.”69
Modern data analytics encompasses three separate scientific disciplines:
“statistics, the study of data relationships using numbers; artificial intelligence,
the use of software and/or machines that display human-like behaviors; and
machine learning or deep learning, the use of algorithms learning from data to
make predictions.”70 Taken together, these tools permit modern data analytics
to help create “systems by which adverse events are reduced by design, rather
than a checklist approach” – e.g., “to move beyond observational reports to the
computer tracking of infection rates, high readmissions, and other adverse events
by physicians, nurses, surgical teams, and other providers.”71 Such capability is
essential to the previously-discussed “root cause” or “contributing factor”
analysis of complex medical errors, and to identify instances where multiple
institutional deficiencies combined to harm a patient. Again, it is generally only
large, institutional providers who have the financial and technical wherewithal
to obtain and effectively use this kind of advanced capability.
Finally, and perhaps most fraught with complicating implications, is the
topic of latest-generation artificial intelligence systems such as IBM’s
“Watson.”72 Writer Jessica S. Allain, in a 2013 article, characterized Watson as
“a medical supercomputer with borderline artificial intelligence.” 73 A more

66. Furrow, supra note 28, at 4.
67. Professor Furrow notes:
The use of early forms of data analytics to examine patient injury in hospitals is found in the
use of statistical analysis based on data collection . . . . Iatrogenic harm, as it used to be
called, was studied systematically by three early pioneers in medical data collection on
patient safety: Florence Nightingale, Dr. Ernest Codman, and Dr. Elihu Schimmel. . . . The
tools they developed laid the foundation for modern data analytics applied to health care.
Id. at 7.
68. Id. at 5.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 11 (citing Data Mining: What it is and Why it Matters, SAS,
https://www.sas.com/enus/insights/analytics/data-mining.html (last visited May 27, 2019)).
71. Id. at 27.
72. See Jessica S. Allain, From Jeopardy to Jaundice: The Medical Liability Implications of Dr
Watson and Other Artificial Intelligence Systems, 73 LA. L. REV. 1049, 1049 n.2 (2013) (explaining that
Watson was “named after International Business Machines Corporation’s (IBM) founder Thomas J.
Watson.”).
73. Id. at 1049.
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technical description can be found in a 2019 article by A. Michael Froomkin, et
al.:
Machine learning (ML) is the discipline of automated pattern
recognition and making predictions based on patterns that are
detected. Neural networks are one of several types of ML. ‘Deep
Learning,’ another term of use, refers to neural networks with many
layers. ‘AI’ is a more general term applied to automated techniques
that produce outputs which appear to mimic human reason or
behavior. Thus, deep-learning systems are a subset of neural
networks, which are a subset of ML, which is itself a subset of AI.
IBM’s Watson . . . is perhaps the best-known example of a neuralnetwork-based medical diagnostic system.74
Allain characterizes Watson’s considerable array of potential capabilities
as including: analysis of patients’ genomes, review of patients’ complete medical
records, and searching entire databases of medical knowledge and research to
facilitate diagnoses and plans of treatment – all accomplished “in a matter of
seconds.”75 She predicts that Watson eventually “may be able to interface
directly with medical equipment and directly treat patients with much less
physician interaction.”76 She notes that “Watson is capable of actually
understanding questions posed and giving the user the correct answer” –
representing “an extraordinary leap in artificial intelligence, deep analytics, and
language processing.”77
Just as with robotic surgical systems, cybermedicine,78 telemedicine,79 and
other emerging medical technologies, it is probably safe to assume that AI
systems such as Watson will eventually develop to the point of reasonable costeffectiveness and wide professional acceptance.80 The point bears making that
the expanded use of telemedicine during the 2020 Covid-19 Pandemic has well
illustrated how the acceptance of such new technologies can be hastened by
unanticipated circumstances.81

74. A. Michael Froomkin et al., When AIs Outperform Doctors: Confronting the Challenges of a
Tort-Induced Over-Reliance on Machine Learning, 61 ARIZ. L. REV. 33, 35 n.4 (2019) (emphasis
added).
75. Allain, supra note 72, at 1049.
76. Id. at 1051.
77. Id. at 1053.
78. “[G]enerally defined as ‘the discipline of applying the Internet to medicine.’” Id. at 1057.
79. “[G]enerally defined as ‘the long-distance practice of medicine via telecommunications.’” Id.
80. Id. at 1055–60.
81. Lisa M. Koonin et al., Trends in the Use of Telehealth During the Emergence of the COVID-19
Pandemic – United States, January-March 2020, 69 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. 1595, 1598
(explaining how the COVID-19 pandemic has shifted the delivery of health care with a share increase in
the use of telehealth).
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Nonetheless, the question still to be confronted is how the law will deal
with the liability implications of these new and still-evolving technologies. Is
Watson essentially no more than a computerized set of clinical practice
guidelines, or is it rather an autonomous (albeit non-sentient) “new member” of
the health care team? Should medical mishaps caused by, or otherwise attributed
to, Watson’s “mistakes” be governed by the law of medical malpractice,
vicarious liability, product liability, or something else?82 As Allain observes:
“Watson partially fits into all of these categories, but no single theory of recovery
sufficiently covers the liability questions that may arise from a computer system
capable of practicing medicine.”83 Moreover, if Watson is (or eventually
becomes) arguably more effective, efficient, and reliable than any individual
medical provider or collective team of providers, how does its presence (or even
just its availability) affect the applicable standard of care? Such questions will
be examined in upcoming sections.
B.

Evidence-Based Medicine

At least two authors have offered specific definitions of “Evidence-Based
Medicine” (“EBM”). According to Allain: “[E]vidence-based medicine is the
‘conscientious, explicit, and judicious use of current best evidence in making
decisions about the care of individual patients. The practice of evidence-based
medicine means integrating individual clinical expertise with the best available
external clinical evidence from systematic research.’”84 Professor Kristin
Madison characterizes it more simply as “a term applied to medical decisionmaking based on ‘good evidence of effectiveness and benefit.’”85 Unfortunately,
such evidence is too often lacking or not utilized: “A much publicized RAND
Corporation study of clinical decision[-]making found that American patients

82. Id. at 1060.
83. Id. at 1060–61.
84. Id. at 1055 n.42 (citing Nicolas P. Terry, An eHealth Diptych: The Impact of Privacy
Regulation on Medical Error and Malpractice Litigation, 27 AM. J. L. & MED. 361, 385–86 (2001)
(citation omitted) (further noting that “[n]ational standards for evidence-based guidelines can be found
online through the National Guideline Clearing House, MedScape, AHRQ, organizations for medical
specialties, and the U.S. National Library of Medicine Medline source.”).
85. Kristin Madison, Donabedian’s Legacy: The Future of Health Care Quality Law and Policy, 10
IND. HEALTH L. REV. 325 (2013) (citing David M. Eddy, Evidence-Based Medicine: A Unified
Approach, 24 HEALTH AFF. 9, 14 (2005) (quoting David M. Eddy, Evidence-Based Medicine: A Unified
Approach, 24 HEALTH AFF. 9, 14 (2005) (“formally defining evidence-based medicine as a ‘set of
principles and methods intended to ensure that to the greatest extent possible, medical decisions,
guidelines, and other types of policies are based on and consistent with good evidence of effectiveness
and benefit’”)).
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receive only 54.9 percent of ‘recommended care’ when measured against a set
of more than four hundred evidence-based best-practice standards.”86
Professor Jessica Mantel has observed that “[a] major source of uncertainty
in medicine is the lack of authoritative evidence and guidelines on the
appropriate course of treatment.”87 She notes that “less than half of medical
decisions [are] supported by adequate evidence regarding an intervention’s
effectiveness . . . .”88 with the result that “clinicians regularly confront
ambiguous choices regarding how best to manage their patients’ care.”89 Adding
further to the uncertainty prevalent in medical practice is the inevitable variation
among individual patients’ clinical response to a given treatment, “inherent value
choices,” and benefit/risk tradeoffs that patients must make, as well as “the
complexity and breadth of information physicians must sort through . . . .”90
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”) of 2010, in
Section 6301, attempts to address this situation by mandating “patient-centered
outcomes research as a part of the larger goal of developing comparative clinical
effectiveness research (CER).”91 “The section defines ‘comparative clinical
effectiveness research’ to mean ‘research evaluating and comparing health
outcomes and the clinical effectiveness, risks, and benefits of 2 or more medical
treatments [and] services . . . .’”92 The law now putting such focus on CER is
expected to “have a profound effect on standardizing physician practice” and
promoting best practices generally.93
1.

Professionally-Acceptable Clinical Practice Guidelines (“CPGs”)

PPACA, along with the stimulus bill entitled the American Recovery
and Reinvestment Act of 2009 (Recovery Act), [i.e., together, the
“ACA”] represents a major federal initiative to standardize medical
practice – a systematic and well-funded national effort to improve
American medicine. Together they pour millions of dollars into
government-funded research on effectiveness, best practices, and
86. M. Gregg Bloche, The Emergent Logic of Health Law, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 389, 402 n.33 (2009)
(citing Elizabeth A. McGlynn et al., The Quality of Health Care Delivered to Adults in the United
States, 348 NEW ENG. J. MED. 2635, 2642 (2003)).
87. Jessica Mantel, The Myth of the Independent Physician: Implications for Health Law, Policy,
and Ethics, 64 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 455, 472 (2013).
88. Id. at 473 (citing CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, RESEARCH ON THE COMPARATIVE EFFECTIVENESS OF
MEDICAL TREATMENTS: ISSUES AND OPTIONS OR AN EXPANDED FEDERAL ROLE 9 (2007)).
89. Id. at 474.
90. Id. at 474–76.
91. Barry R. Furrow, Regulating Patient Safety: The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
159 U. PA. L. REV. 1727, 1738 (2011); Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C.A. §
1320e(b)–(c) (2019) (establishing the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research Institute).
92. Id.; Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1320e(a)(2)(A) (2019).
93. Furrow, supra note 91, at 1739.
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practice guidelines. This research is backed by new centers and
initiatives to disseminate findings and motivate providers to
incorporate them into practice.94
“The Institute of Medicine defines CPGs as ‘statements that include
recommendations intended to optimize patient care that are informed by a
systematic review of evidence and an assessment of the benefits and harms of
alternative care options.’”95 However, the IOM has also said that ‘“the quality
of CPG development processes and guideline developer adherence to quality
standards have remained unsatisfactory and unreliable for decades.’”96 Professor
Laura D. Hermer observes that “[l]ack of unanimity, failure to consistently
obtain independent review, commercial conflict of interest, and personal bias all
complicate CPG development. Varieties of schema have been developed to
address these problems, but none has yet been systematically implemented.”97
It is perhaps because many people feel that “[g]overnment-generated
practice guidelines and best practices are likely to be an improvement over the
currently predominant medical-specialty-created guidelines” that the ACA
“requires the HHS Secretary to identify existing and new clinical practice
guidelines.”98 That is exactly what the Agency for Healthcare Research and
Quality (“AHRQ”) did up until July 16, 2018 – the date that the Trump
Administration effectively defunded the National Guideline Clearinghouse
(“NGC”).99 “According to the ARHQ, it’s possible another organization will
take over managing the guidelines clearinghouse. However, ‘it is not clear’ when
or if the clearinghouse or something like it will be online again.”100

94. Id. at 1736 (emphasis added) (citing American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, Pub.
L. No. 111-5, 123 Stat. 115 (2009)).
95. Laura D. Hermer, Aligning Incentives in Accountable Care Organizations: The Role of Medical
Malpractice Reform, 17 J. HEALTH CARE L. & POL’Y 271, 281 (2014) (quoting INST. OF MED.,
CLINICAL PRAC. GUIDELINES WE CAN TRUST 4 (Robin Graham et al. eds., The National Academies
Press, 2011)).
96. Id. at 283 (again citing INST. OF MED., CLINICAL PRAC. GUIDELINES WE CAN TRUST 4 (Robin
Graham et al. eds., The National Academies Press, 2011)).
97. Id.
98. Furrow, supra note 91, at 1741.
99. Andrew Bergman, Explained: The Shutdown of the National Guideline Clearinghouse and the
Independent Efforts to Launch a Replacement, SUNLIGHT FOUNDATION (July 20, 2018, 04:29 PM),
https://sunlightfoundation.com/2018/07/20/explained-the-shutdown-of-the-national-guidelineclearinghouse-and-the-independent-efforts-to-launch-a-replacement/. “On Monday, July 16, [2018] the
Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (AHRQ) shut down its National Guideline Clearinghouse
(NGC), formerly hosted at www.guideline.gov, a website that had gotten about 200,000 visitors per
month, according to AHRQ, and, for almost 20 years, had been medical professionals’ go-to resource
for finding and understanding medical guidelines.” Id.
100. Lauren Vogel, Trump Administration Shutters Clinical Guidelines Database, 190 CANADIAN
MED. ASS’N J. E841, E841 (2018).
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In view of this obvious setback, another observation of Professor Hermer
becomes all the more relevant: “The use of best practices could arguably be both
complemented and furthered by reforming medical malpractice law to expand
the use and importance of appropriately-developed clinical practice guidelines
(CPGs) in medical malpractice cases.”101
III. RECONSTRUCTING MEDICAL/FIDUCIARY DUTIES AND LIABILITY
Professor M. Gregg Bloche has opined: “Medical tort law’s approach to
health care quality and value is a relic of past, disproven premises about the
practice of medicine.”102 He explains:
Tort law can make another contribution to health care quality and
value by incorporating state-of-the-art, systems approaches to the
management of medical services. This will require moving beyond
blame for individuals and toward shared duties to disseminate and
adopt evidence-based protocols, coordinate diagnosis and treatment
in complex cases, employ information systems that avert mistakes, and
report and learn from errors. For example, a doctor’s failure to
prescribe beta blockers or aspirin to a heart attack patient upon
discharge from the hospital should be treated not just as negligence on
her part, but as breach of duty by the hospital – if the hospital has not
made these medications part of its post-heart-attack protocol and
adopted monitoring practices to minimize the risk of their omission.
And a nurse’s misunderstanding of a doctor’s hard-to-read
handwritten order, resulting in a fatal overdose, should be understood
not merely as the nurse’s (or the doctor’s) negligence, but as the
hospital’s breach of its duty to employ reasonably safe information
systems.103
In a 2008 article, Professors Michelle M. Mello and David M. Studdert
discuss the results of “a large empirical study of closed malpractice claims” that
they conducted from 2001-2006 – the “Malpractice Insurers Medical Error
Prevention and Surveillance Study (“MIMEPS”).104 The study had three major
goals: (1) to determine “the prevalence of medical error among claims;” (2) to
discover “the failures and breakdowns in care” that resulted in the claims; and,
(3) to identify “promising prevention measures.”105 The study resulted in three
key findings implicating, if not outright contradicting, traditional tort doctrine:
101. Hermer, supra note 95, at 281 (emphasis added).
102. Bloche, supra note 86, at 462.
103. Id. at 468 (emphasis added).
104. Michelle M. Mello & David M. Studdert, Deconstructing Negligence: The Role of Individual
and System Factors in Causing Medical Injuries, 96 GEO. L.J. 599, 601 (2008).
105. Id.
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first, that “the causality of medical injuries is multifactorial and weblike”
(contrary to the customary notion of a “causal chain”); second, that in making
causality determinations in complex medical situations, it is difficult to separate
individual failures from the operative system environments in which they occur
(raising doubts about “medical malpractice doctrine’s heavy focus on individual
liability”); and third, “the patterns of etiologic factors” indicate that effective
“opportunities for injury prevention” most likely exist “at the organizational
level” (rather than the individual level).106 Accordingly, the authors argue:
Like most branches of tort law, medical malpractice is largely
premised on the notions that injuries arise from individual
carelessness or lack of expertise, that culpable actors can be readily
identified, and that their negligence can be deterred by setting
damages sufficiently high to induce medical professionals to take due
care.
The emerging science of patient safety takes a very different view of
the occurrence and prevention of medical injury. This field, which
draws heavily from the traditions of industrial organization and
complex-systems engineering, emphasizes the role of ‘system
failures’ in causing injuries, rejecting simple characterizations of error
as individual physicians’ carelessness or incompetence. A ‘system’
in this context is ‘a set of interdependent elements,’ both human and
non-human, ‘interacting to achieve a common aim.’ In other words,
the concept refers to the interrelationships among health care
providers, the tools they use, and the environment in which they carry
out their work. The system view of accident causation asserts that it
is misguided to prioritize, and dead wrong to focus exclusively on,
lapses by individual health care providers because most medical
outcomes, including those that flow from errors, are essentially the
product of organizational structures and processes. It is a view that
resonates with providers at the front lines of care.107
From all of this, the authors conclude that a “realigning” or “reorientation” of
tort doctrine “to expand corporate or enterprise liability is needed.”108

106. Id.
107. Id. at 600 (emphasis added).
108. Id. at 601 (emphasis added).
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Redefining Medical Malpractice

The typical defendants in U.S. medical malpractice lawsuits are
healthcare providers targeted for individual acts of negligence, either
directly or through the doctrine of respondeat superior. However,
according to the Institute of Medicine (“IOM”), blaming an individual
does little to prevent medical errors and improve patient safety,
because most errors can only be prevented by identifying and
resolving systemic failures. Although individual provider negligence
should be, and is, addressed through the tort system, healthcare
organizations are rarely held accountable for acts of systemic or
organizational negligence. As a result, the malpractice system fails
to promote the systemic change in healthcare organizations needed to
improve patient safety.109
According to Professor James F. Blumstein, the ‘“central message’” of the
above-noted IOM report110 “was that ‘errors are caused by faulty systems not by
faulty people.’”111 Such assertion “is in considerable tension with many
traditional assumptions and premises of medical malpractice doctrine” and
“pose[s] direct challenges to traditional medical malpractice norms and
understandings.”112 Specifically, Blumstein notes that the systems approach
advocated by the IOM deemphasizes “individual responsibility or accountability
through legal liability”:
. . . Many of the strategies . . . , such as protections from discovery
for error-reporting and the elimination of identifying characteristics
from data collected, would make imposition of legal liability more
difficult or impossible. Indeed, the systems approach advocated by
the IOM, in essence, views traditional medical malpractice doctrine,
itself justified as a form of quality assurance as well as a mechanism
for victim compensation, as something of an impediment to achieving
patient safety.113

109. Mindy Nunez Duffourc, Repurposing the Affirmative Defense of Comparative Fault in Medical
Malpractice Cases to Improve Patient Safety, 16 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 21, 21 (2018) (emphasis added).
110. COMM. ON QUALITY OF HEALTH CARE IN AM., INST. OF MED., TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A
SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM (Linda T. Krohn, et al. eds., 2000).
111. James F. Blumstein, The Legal Liability Regime: How Well Is It Doing in Assuring Quality,
Accounting for Costs, and Coping with an Evolving Reality in the Health Care Marketplace, 11 ANNALS
HEALTH L. 125, 138 (2002) (citing Lucian L. Leape, Foreword: Preventing Medical Accidents: Is
“Systems Analysis”
the Answer?, 27 AM. J. L. & MED. 145, 145 (2001)).
112. Id. at 139.
113. Id. (emphasis added.)
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Traditionally (and still currently), medical malpractice law is governed by
state-specific common law and judicial rules that treat it as a particular species
of the tort of negligence.114 Generally speaking, every state jurisdiction requires
the plaintiff in a medical malpractice action to establish four common law
elements as regards their alleged medical injury:
1. Duty – as defined by the applicable “standard of care”
2. Breach – of that standard, as demonstrated by expert testimony
3. Proximate cause – establishing the legal relationship between the
breach and the alleged injury
4. Damages – the medical injury resulting in compensable harm115
Because of the obvious tension between the IOM approach and the
“existing regime of medical malpractice liability doctrine,” Blumstein urges
“some hard rethinking” characterized by “constructive dialogue and flexibility”
to reach a needed “doctrinal hybrid.”116 With that advice in mind, we will
proceed with our discussion using the traditional medical malpractice construct
as our analytical framework.
1.

What was the Duty and by Whom was it Owed?

First, let us begin by openly acknowledging our bias. Blumstein has
characterized two “competing visions of medical care – the professional model
and [the] economic model.”117 While these two models are not mutually
exclusive, they can be distinguished by their principal attributes. The
professional model: dictates that medical diagnosis and treatment be based solely
on scientific evidence and criteria without empirical or normative regard of
financial considerations, and be “available to all patients on the basis of medical
need.”118 The economic model, in contrast: “advocates the virtues of pluralism
in the marketplace and the desirability of choice based on individual preferences

114. See generally, Peter P. Budetti and Teresa M. Waters, Medical Malpractice Law in the United
States, HENRY J. KAISER FAM. FOUND., May 2005, at 1–2 (explaining how medical malpractice
developed through state common law).
115. See Blumstein, supra note 111, at 130 (describing the common law elements of medical
malpractice); see generally Budetti & Waters, supra note 114, at 1–4 (explaining medical negligence in
a malpractice action).
116. See Blumstein, supra note 111, at 141.
117. Id. at 125.
118. See id. at 126–27, 130 (explaining the underlying assumptions of the professional model and its
effect on patient care).

CORBETT 05 (DO NOT DELETE)

12/23/2021 10:56 AM

2021] OPERATIONALIZING THE HEALTH CARE BENEFIT CORPORATION

293

and stratified resource availability.”119 We subscribe to, and advocate for, the
professional model.120
Second, let us note the extent to which we have now argued that health care
delivery in this country has moved well beyond the purview of individual
practitioners providing discrete medical services for which they can be held
singularly responsible for an eventual bad outcome.121 From the perspective of
tort law, the issue is increasing shifting to who – among many involved health
care delivery participants – owes relevant duties to the patient.122 That is to say,
the ubiquitous and complex nature of team-provided health care today
necessarily raises issues of defendant indeterminacy when things go wrong, and
often requires resort to various theories of alternative liability in order to
determine proper accountability.123
a. The Standard of Care for Medical Negligence
Traditionally, in a legal action for the tort of medical negligence, the
relevant duty is defined by the medical profession’s “standard of care.”124 The
law presumes “that, as a scientific matter, a standard of practice exists and that,
as an empirical matter, practitioners conform their conduct to that standard.”125
According to Blumstein, the standard is “doctrinally embodied” in the
‘“customary practices of the medical profession”‘ as “established by appropriate
expert medical testimony.”126 In contrast to an ordinary, non-professional
negligence case – where a defendant’s compliance with “customary” conduct is
relevant to, but not dispositive of, a jury’s determination of negligence – “the
professional standard governing medical liability is based on professional norms
and on the ‘assumption that science has established a single or unitary standard
of practice and that unitary standard is in fact uniformly implemented in the
medical profession.’”127
However, critics argue it is fallacious to maintain that “there exists one
single correct medical response to every clinical problem” and “that this single
correct response is, and should be, determined without reference to cost” and

119. Id. at 130.
120. That is not to say, of course, that we in any way disavow the critical importance of informed
consent, patient-centered care, shared decision-making, and/or a patient’s right to self-determination in
refusing any recommended medical treatment or supportive care.
121. See supra Part II Section A.1–2.
122. See supra Part II Section A.2.
123. See supra Part II Section A.2.
124. See supra text accompanying note 115.
125. James F. Blumstein, Medical Malpractice Standard-Setting: Developing Malpractice Safe
Harbors as a New Role for QIOs, 59 VAND. L. REV. 1017, 1023 (2006).
126. Id. at 1023–24 (emphasis added).
127. Id. at 1024.
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other considerations.128 This disagreement has spilled over into continuing
debate about the proper development and use of clinical practice guidelines:
[T]he goal is to ‘develop ‘evidence-based’ diagnostic and therapeutic
recommendations for each medical condition.’ That is, the response
of the adherents of the professional/scientific paradigm has been to
develop better science to restore the confidence in the scientific
ideal.129
Those seeking to restore the scientific ideal would tend to favor
formulation and adoption of clinical practice guidelines as a
regulatory technique for establishing uniformity in clinical practice as
conceptualized under the professional/scientific ideal. Advocates of
a pluralistic approach, which would be sensitive to concerns of costconsciousness and to consumer/payer preferences as reflected in
private contracting would view the role of such guidelines differently
– as grounds for specifying different levels or styles of service through
private choice.130
While we have admitted our bias in support of evidence-based clinical
practice guidelines, we acknowledge the considerable criticism that many in the
medical profession have voiced against what they consider to be promotion of
“cookbook medicine” that improperly impinges on their professional
autonomy.131 Others have been critical of CPGs, and the customary practice
standard generally, on the grounds that both stifle desirable advancement of
medical innovation.132 They argue that “innovating” physicians risk deviating
from “custom,” thus causing potential malpractice exposure for “unreasonable
behavior” regardless of outcome.133 As a result of such criticisms, the use of
“customary practice” as a legal defense is starting to diminish:
Already, a dozen states have expressly rejected deference to medical
customs and another nine, although not directly addressing the role of
custom, have rephrased their standard of care in terms of the
reasonable physician, rather than compliance with medical custom.

128. See id. at 1024 n.35 (citing Gail B. Agrawal & Mark A. Hall, What If You Could Sue Your
HMO? Managed Care Liability Beyond the ERISA Shield, 47 ST. LOUIS L.J. 235, 285 (2003)).
129. Blumstein, supra note 111, at 136 (emphasis added).
130. Id. at 136–37 n.60 (emphasis added).
131. See Blumstein, supra note 125, at 1035 n.91.
132. See Froomkin et al., supra note 74, at 54–55.
133. Id. at 55.
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Even more important than the raw numbers is the trend revealed by
the decisions. The slow but steady judicial abandonment of deference
to medical custom began in earnest in the 1970s, continued in the
1980s, and retained its vitality through the 1990s. Showing no signs
of exhaustion, this movement could eventually become the majority
position.134
Thus, some have said that the malpractice standard of care “is being normalized
and brought into alignment with the ordinary tort duty of care, permitting courts
to hold that even widespread medical practices can be negligent.”135
Yet, another issue in the still-ongoing debate is the way in which
malpractice standards are established. As previously noted, the “customary
practice standard” – and for that matter, the “reasonable physician standard” –
are both necessarily established after the fact (i.e., ex post), by the fact-finder,
during a trial.136 For the most part, CPGs – if offered at all – have been admitted
as no more than one piece of evidence relevant to the question of the asserted
standard, to be considered along with expert testimony adduced by both sides.137
Rarely have they been successfully offered as an already-established and
broadly-accepted standard systematically developed in advance (i.e., ex ante) by
one or the other professional organization.138 Put differently, CPGs have
generally been viewed and treated in most jurisdictions as “evidence” of the
standard of care, not themselves “defining” the standard of care.
Difficult questions remain: Is it even possible to develop CPGs that can or
should serve as ex ante dispositive standards governing determinations of
liability for medical negligence? Is the practice of medicine a science or an art;
or both, in some indeterminate and constantly-shifting proportions? To again
quote Blumstein: “In a fundamental way and in many areas of practice, the
widespread existence of clinical uncertainty calls into question a cornerstone of
medical malpractice law – the assumption that there is a professionally[]determined and scientifically[-]validated standard of care.”139 Similarly, as
Professor Hermer observes:
Finally, there are simply many circumstances in which, at least for the
foreseeable future, no definitive guidelines will – or can – exist. These
issues make it unlikely that CPGs could, on their own, provide a

134. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Philip G. Peters, Jr., The Quiet Demise of Deference to Custom:
Malpractice Law at the Millennium, 57 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 163, 164 (2000)).
135. Id. at 55–56.
136. Blumstein, supra note 125, at 1028.
137. Id. at 1029.
138. Id. at 1028.
139. Id. at 1027.
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satisfactory and sufficient response to the problems inherent in our
medical malpractice regime at present, or anytime in the near future.140
Nonetheless, we believe that CPGs have an important role to play – a role
that the HCBC, as a new form of corporate health care entity, can best facilitate.
Professor Hermer has presaged this role in her discussions of CPGs in the context
of ACOs:
Accordingly, if an ACO wants physicians to buy-in to the standards it
adopts or promulgates, it will need to be able to convince physicians
that they will not suffer increased liability by following cost- and
waste-conscious CPGs that the ACO might promulgate. Physicians
may be skeptical, however. Short of ACOs offering indemnification
to physicians for following the CPGs that they adopt, our medical
malpractice system would have to change by, for example, permitting
CPGs to be used as a shield in malpractice suits. Yet this would, at
minimum, entail addressing many of the problems raised by guideline
development, choice, and uses that were discussed earlier. . . . As a
different solution, it may instead be time once again to consider
adopting exclusive enterprise liability, at least in the context of
ACOs.141
As will become clear in our discussions in later sections, we believe that the
HCBC is well structured to develop its own CPGs, indemnify its physicians and
staff for following them, and to assume legal accountability for outcomes
through acceptance of exclusive enterprise liability. The question of duty,
however, does not end there.
b.

The Need to Recognize Broader Fiduciary Duties

“Malpractice” is defined as “a dereliction of professional duty or a failure
to exercise an ordinary degree of professional skill or learning by one (such
as a physician) rendering professional services which results in injury, loss,
or damage.”142 Accordingly, any professional member of a health care “team”
who either negligently or intentionally acts, or fails to act, in violation of the

140. Hermer, supra note 95, at 284.
141. Id. at 293 (emphasis added).
142. Malpractice, MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/malpractice
(last visited Jan. 30, 2021) (emphasis added).
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requirements of their “scope of practice” as set forth in their applicable State
Practice Act, 143 can be deemed to have committed medical malpractice. 144
As we have discussed at length in our previous two articles, such
professional duties have come, over time, to be recognized as fiduciary. As
Professor Thomas L. Hafemeister and Joshua Hinckley Porter note:
[T]he steady historical expansion of hospitals’ services and their
corresponding legal duties to patients has reached a point in today’s
medical environment where hospitals have assumed, and patients
expect them to assume, a more central role in the delivery of health
care than ever before – a role that increasingly can be seen as fiduciary
in nature.145
The previously-noted Fiduciary Medicine Model proposed by Professor Dayna
B. Matthew essentially formalizes this recognition and extends such fiduciary
duty to all participants on the health care team (professional and nonprofessional alike), as well as to the organization employing (or otherwise
engaging) them itself. 146 Consistent with our discussion in Part II Section
A.2., Professor Matthew acknowledges the implications of today’s “teamprovided” health care and (in our opinion) properly characterizes the team’s
collective responsibility as being fiduciary in nature. 147 Further, she provides
a cogent rationale for an evolving doctrine of institutional accountability,
which we have previously discussed:
Accountability is an obligation or willingness to accept responsibility
or to account for one’s actions.’ Moreover, ‘[f]iduciary law,
embodied in common law duties, statutory standards, and equitable
principles, is the primary legal mechanism for assuring accountability
in American corporations.’ Inasmuch as institutional delivery-of-care

143. See generally, Assessing Scope of Practice in Health Care Delivery: Critical Questions in
Assuring Public Access and Safety, FED’N OF STATE MED. BD. (2005),
https://www.fsmb.org/siteassets/advocacy/policies/assessing-scope-of-practice-in-health-caredelivery.pdf (discussing the importance of ‘collaboration’ and ‘accountability’ in the health care sector
by declaring their effectiveness in “providing safe and competent health care”).
144. See generally, What is Medical Malpractice? AM. BD. OF PRO. LIAB. ATT’Y,
www.abpla.org/what-is-malpractice (last visited Mar 8, 2021) (proclaiming that a medical malpractice
claim must: (1) be “[a] violation of the standard of care”; (2) include “[a]n injury [that] was caused by
the negligence”; and (3) prove that “[t]he injury resulted in significant damages”).
145. Thomas L. Hafemeister & Joshua Hinckley Porter, Don’t Let Go Of The Rope: Reducing
Readmissions By Recognizing Hospitals’ Fiduciary Duties To Their Discharged Patients, 62 AM. U. L.
REV. 513, 525 (February, 2013).
146. Dayna B. Matthew, Implementing American Health Care Reform: The Fiduciary Imperative, 59
BUFF. L. REV. 715, 762 (2011).
147. Id. at 744–45.
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providers – most of whom adopt the corporate form of organization –
have come to be increasingly recognized as having fiduciary duties to
the patients they serve, it should come as no surprise that
“accountability” has become a central tenet of health care reform. In
fact, the concept is ‘imbedded in one of the principal proposed reform
mechanisms, the Accountable Care Organization. Indeed, the very
name suggests that this new, integrated, coordinated-care organization
itself has a fiduciary obligation to the patients it serves . . . .’ To quote
Professor Marc A. Rodwin: ‘Public policy and market forces are
creating pressures for greater physician and provider accountability.
And accountability is the core of the fiduciary ideal.’ 148
Professor Matthew’s proposed model has much of interest – more of which
we have already discussed in some detail in our previous two articles.149 For
present purposes, suffice it to say that the most significant contribution of her
proposal, in our opinion, is the way in which it would expand liability beyond
just the involved licensed medical professionals and institutions to now include
essentially all participants in the “team-delivery” of health care services. While
it may remain debatable whether or not an unlicensed team member or
organization can commit “medical malpractice” as heretofore defined, there is
growing consensus that unlicensed, non-professional individuals and institutions
can and should be held accountable for concomitant tortious (either negligent
or intentional) breach of fiduciary duties to patients.150 As we will continue to
discuss, the best way to effect such accountability would be through institutional
acceptance of enterprise liability for both medical negligence and breach of
fiduciary duty.
2.

What was the Breach and How did it Occur?

Professor Grout et al. observe that the term “malpractice” is usually taken
to mean the circumstance wherein a patient has been harmed by a physician or
other health care provider (“HCP”) and sues them for negligence.151 While true,
it should be noted that this is not exclusively the case – that is, although rare,
malpractice cases can “present claims of intentional or reckless wrongdoing, as
opposed to negligence.”152 Nonetheless, most malpractice claims are in fact
brought as negligence claims for alleged “medical errors,” which they define as
“an HCP’s act of ‘commission or . . . omission . . . that would have been judged
148. See Corbett, supra note 17, at 303.
149. Id. at 303–06; Corbett, supra note 3, at 176–78.
150. See, e.g., Furrow, supra note 28, at 50 (discussing the fiduciary duties of members of a
hospital’s board of directors for ensuring patient safety).
151. Grout et al., supra note 49, at 397.
152. Id. at 397 n.43 (citing KENNETH R. WING, LAW AND THE PUBLIC’S HEALTH 290–91 (6th ed.
2003)).
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wrong by skilled and knowledgeable peers at the time it occurred.’”153 They go
on to say: “Given the process nature of healthcare, the key question for liability
purposes will often be whether an HCP’s actions or omissions deviated so much
from those that are usual and customary as to constitute a ‘process variation.’”154
Simply put, such “medical errors” or “process variations” constitute the
alleged “breach” that must be shown to establish negligence. It is important to
recognize, however, that such breaches are not necessarily singular events
involving one person. Sometimes, one or more persons may have had a role in
the same medical error; other times, one or more persons may have been involved
in a series of medical errors that collectively result in harm to a patient. Thus,
the “negligence liability environment” – particularly in the “team” context in
which care is typically delivered today – increasingly involves the prospect of
“individual-error, group-error and[or] system-error.”155 In the complex
institutional setting in which today’s team health care is delivered, each of these
types of error can and does occur – interacting in a montage that some have
analogized to a “spider web”:156
First, most errors are multifactorial and often involve both
cognitive/knowledge and system/process failures. Second, most care
is delivered through a series of frequently complex processes that are
often plagued with a lack of consistency and a cultural dependence
upon individuals. These considerations lead to variability in the
quality of delivery. Third, medicine involves both art and science and
requires subjective judgment, especially in the art component. Given
that subjectivity, the predominant culture influences both behaviors
and outcomes. Underlying the medical culture is a host of behavioral
issues that contribute to medical errors through various psychological
and epistemological influences. When combined with the customary
defensive responses by HCPs to systemic failure and the absence of a
comprehensive, centralized system for measuring, tracking, and
reporting errors, the three considerations identified above operate as
barriers to reducing the incidence of medical errors.157

153. Compare id. at 395, with Mello & Studdert, supra note 104, at 603 n.18 (citing INST. OF MED.,
TO ERR IS HUMAN: BUILDING A SAFER HEALTH SYSTEM 54 (Linda T. Kohn et al. eds., 2000)) defining
medical error as: “the failure of a planned action to be completed as intended (e.g., error of execution) or
the use of a wrong plan to achieve an aim (e.g., error of planning).”
154. Grout et al., supra note 49, at 395 n.33 (citing JOHN D. BANJA, MEDICAL ERRORS AND
MEDICAL NARCISSISM 6 (2005)).
155. Id. at 400 (emphasis added).
156. See id. at 401 n.67.
157. Id. at 401 (emphasis added).
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Needless to say, this multiplicity and interactivity of possible breaches
underlying any given negligence claim presents plaintiffs with a growing
challenge in the traditional medical malpractice construct.
3.
Injury?

What was the Causal Relationship Between the Breach and the Alleged

The next requirement for a plaintiff seeking accountability is to establish
that the breach (or breaches) at issue were the “proximate cause” of the alleged
medical injury. Again, the complexity added by today’s team health care – with
its corresponding addition of multiple and interacting potential breaches – makes
this required relational proof equally if not more confounding.
In the traditional malpractice construct, once a breach of the standard of
care has been demonstrated it remains to be shown whether a “sufficient causal
link” existed between that breach and the plaintiff’s injury.158 That is, that the
breach was either the “but for” cause of, or was a “substantial factor” in, the
injury.159 As Professor Hill et al. explain:
The causation requirement has two parts: actual cause and proximate
cause. Both parts must be established. Actual cause is established
under the “but for” or substantial factor tests . . . . Depending upon
the test used in the jurisdiction whose law controls, proximate cause
exists if the harm experienced by the plaintiff was a foreseeable
consequence of the defendant’s breach or was a natural and probable
consequence of the breach. If actual cause exists in a medical
malpractice case, proximate cause is likely to exist as well. With
HCPs typically furnishing medical treatment to persons who were
already ill or injured, the patient whose condition was worsened as a
result of negligent medical treatment may have a valid malpractice
claim for the harm associated with the worsened condition, even
though the HCP was neither the initial nor sole cause of the condition
that warranted treatment.160
According to Professor Nancy Lee Firak, the difference between actual
(factual) and proximate (legal) causation is that the former is an issue of “what
happened,” the latter is an issue of “what law ought to do about it.”161 Thus, the

158. Hill et al., supra note 60, at 167–68.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 168 n.49 (emphasis added).
161. Nancy Lee Firak, The Developing Policy Characteristics of Cause-in-Fact: Alternative Forms
of Liability, Epidemiological Proof and Trans-Scientific Issues, 63 TEMP. L. REV. 311, 311 (1990)
(citing Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60, 60 (1956)).
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bifurcation is intended to keep factual questions separate from policy
questions.162 Professor Firak elaborates:
Since the bifurcation of causation, cause-in-fact is intended to be a
scientific, objective inquiry into the actual causes of events, and
proximate cause is intended to reflect policy limits on liability. Causein-fact is the critical first threshold to liability. Without an affirmative
showing of cause-in-fact, there is no inquiry into proximate cause.
Because of the practical problems of proof, however, the goal of
maintaining objectivity in the cause-in-fact inquiry has always been
elusive.163
Further complicating the overall causation question is the legal doctrine of
“superseding” or “intervening” causation, which health care organizations will
often raise as an affirmative defense to comparative negligence allegations
against them – arguing that an individual “provider’s medical malpractice was a
superseding cause of a plaintiff’s injuries, especially if the organizational
negligence alleged involves administrative decisions [that were] remote in time
and not easily connected to the provider’s act of malpractice.”164 In today’s
institutional health care environment, it is increasingly necessary and often
difficult to distinguish acts that are “administrative” and “not easily connected”
from acts that are clinically-related to ongoing treatment.
The fact is, the traditional medical malpractice construct requires the
plaintiff to present “factual evidence that ‘singles out from the crowd’ the person
who in fact caused the plaintiff’s injury and the trier-of-fact [to measure] the
credibility of the plaintiff’s evidence against a standard of persuasion known as
the preponderance of the evidence rule.”165 However, as Professor Firak goes on
to explain:
[T]he preponderance of the evidence rule, as traditionally understood,
does not relieve a plaintiff from the requirement of identifying, from
among all others, the one who caused the injury. While the
preponderance of the evidence rule may occasionally result in a wrong
answer to the question of whether the named defendant was the causein-fact of plaintiff’s injury, this standard was never intended to allow
a plaintiff to prove cause-in-fact with a showing of only a statistical

162. Id.
163. Id. at 314.
164. See Duffourc, supra note 109, at 37–38 (emphasis added).
165. See Firak, supra note 161, at 315 (citing E. Wayne Thode, Tort Analysis: Duty-Risk v.
Proximate Cause and the Rational Allocation of Functions Between Judge and Jury, 1977 UTAH L. REV.
1, 2 (1977)).
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probability that the identified defendant is the one who caused his or
her injury.166
It is becoming increasingly clear that achieving accountability in today’s team
health care environment requires resort to alternative forms of liability.
Accordingly, our purpose in the next section is not to discuss the usual issue of
how a plaintiff establishes and proves damages, but rather the issue of who
properly should be held to account for those damages.
4.

Who Should be Held Responsible for the Patient’s Damages?

Increasingly, in “nontraditional tort cases,” problems of defendant
identification have resulted in relaxation of the “traditional cause-in-fact
requirement” in favor of one or the other alternative form of liability:
There are several alternative forms of liability now recognized by the
courts, including alternative liability (sometimes called alternate
liability), industry-wide liability (sometimes called enterprise
liability), concert of action liability (sometimes called the concerted
action theory), market-share liability, and risk contribution (or risk
share) liability. All of these different theories of liability represent
precedent-setting departures from the traditional cause-in-fact
requirement. Yet all are quite limited in their scope of application.167
Where “indisputedly innocent plaintiffs” have been unable to prove
exactly who caused their injury, policy considerations have dictated that
“defendants who created risks of the type that caused the injury” should be held
accountable.168 The principal reason, then, that alternative forms of liability have
developed is to provide recourse to innocent plaintiffs confronted with
indeterminate defendants.169 Instead of focusing on the factual question of “what
happened,” such forms are said to focus more on the question of what the law
ought to do about it.”170 Thus, they respond “to questions about facts with
answers about policy.”171
While medical malpractice cases can hardly be called “nontraditional,” it is
nonetheless true that malpractice plaintiffs are indisputably innocent and often
(particularly today) unable to prove who, individually, caused their injuries.
Thus, more than ever, alternative forms of liability in medical malpractice cases
166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.

Id. (emphasis added).
Id. at 316 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id. at 340.
Id.
Id.
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“makes both scientific and policy sense” – “scientific sense because the
defendant’s [defendants’] conduct [collectively] created the type of risk that
caused injury to the plaintiff,” and “policy sense because the plaintiff is not at
fault in being unable to identify the proper [individual] defendant.”172
a.

Liability when Tortfeasors Indeterminate

According to Professor M. Stuart Madden and Jamie Holian, alternative
liability originated as a “burden-shifting approach to tortfeasor indeterminacy”
in the 1948 California case of Summers v. Tice.173 In that case, the plaintiff could
not prove which of two negligently-shooting hunters actually injured him, only
that “it was equally likely that each was the source of the bullet.”174 In response
to the plaintiff’s “source indeterminacy” problem, the California Supreme Court
shifted the burden of proof to both defendants “to prove that they did not cause
the plaintiff’s injury.”175 If neither could do so, then each “would be jointly and
severally liable.”176 The “primary limitation” on this alternative liability
approach is that “all of the potential tortfeasors must be before the court.”177
Concert of action liability is a second way that courts have dealt with
tortfeasor indeterminacy. The theory “posits that when a group of actors agree,
whether explicitly or tacitly, to proceed in risk-creating behavior, each of the
actors will be jointly and severally liable if that behavior results in injury to
another.”178 The usually-cited paradigm case – the holding of which was limited

172. Id. at 334.
173. M. Stuart Madden & Jamie Holian, Defendant Indeterminacy: New Wine Into Old Skins, 67 LA.
L. REV. 785, 790 (2007) (citing Summers v. Tice, 199 P.2d 963, 964 (Cal. 1948) (noting evidence did
not clearly show which of the two defendant hunters’ shots struck plaintiff, finding that pellets lodged in
the plaintiff’s eye and lip as a result of shots fired by ‘defendants[,] and each of them’ was a sufficient
finding that defendants were jointly liable and that negligence of both was the cause of injury).
174. Id.
175. Id. The authors go on to note:
“Underlying the court’s decision were such factors as: (1) the plaintiff’s inability, through no
fault of his own, to identify the tortfeasor; (2) the joint culpability of the defendants, in that
both fired negligently at a target they had not determined to be prey; and (3) the defendants’
superior position, when contrasted to that of the plaintiff, to prove which one caused the
injury.”
Id. (citing Summers, 199 P.2d at 967).
176. Id. at 791.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 792. The authors explain:
The analogy often used is that of two automobile or motorcycle drivers pulled up at the same
stoplight. By a nod or by simple eye contact, they affirm that they will race each other when
the light turns green. If their joint race ends up hurting a third party, both drivers or riders
will be liable for the harm. This will be true even if it is clearly only one vehicle that injured
the plaintiff, such as, e.g., only one of the two vehicles skids out of control and injures a
pedestrian.
Id. at 792 n.33.

CORBETT 05 (DO NOT DELETE)

304

JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY

12/23/2021 10:56 AM

[VOL. 24:2

to its facts – is the 1982 decision in Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co.179 The case
involved all of the producers of the miscarriage drug DES, who sought quick
Food and Drug Administrative approval by cooperating “together in pooling
information, agreeing on the formula for the drug, and adopting packaging
models,” while having “tacit knowledge” that there had been inadequate testing
to prove the drug’s effectiveness.180 The court concluded that because all of the
producers had engaged in “conscious parallel activity,” the plaintiff had the
option of proceeding against “any joint tortfeasor.”181 That is,
[a]lthough the evidence showed that the pharmacy from which the
plaintiff’s mother purchased the DES stocked a generic DES product
of four or five different producers, and although the plaintiff
admittedly could not prove that Lilly produced the pill that caused her
injury, she was not required to include additional producers as
defendants.182
A third way that courts have dealt with tortfeasor indeterminacy is through
industry-wide liability (sometimes called “enterprise liability”). “The pioneer
case in this area was the 1972 case of Hall v. E.L Du Pont De Nemours & Co.”183
While Madden and Holian credit Hall as “establishing the enterprise liability
theory,” we will explain in the next section how “enterprise liability” has come
to have meanings different from that described in Hall.184 Hall involved multiple
children “injured by blasting caps manufactured by six different
manufacturers.”185 Because of the explosion, it was impossible to identify which
manufacturer’s caps caused the injuries.186 Accordingly, the plaintiffs argued
that since all six of the manufacturers followed long-standing industry practices
of not placing warnings on the blasting caps and of delegating the responsibility
for warnings about the known risks to a trade association, all the manufacturers
could be held jointly liable under an alternative form of liability.187
The court agreed, holding that the defendants’ “joint adherence” to the
industry labeling practice caused a risk for which the defendants jointly shared
179. See Firak, supra note 161, at 318–19 n.39 (citing Bichler v. Eli Lilly & Co., 436 N.Y.S.2d 625
(N.Y. App. Div. 1981), aff’d, 436 N.E.2d 182 (N.Y. 1982)) (describing the seminal case regarding
paradigms).
180. Id. at 319.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Hall v. E.L Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 345 F. Supp. 353 (E.D.N.Y. 1972).
184. See Madden & Holian, supra note 173, at 792 n.35.
185. Firak, supra note 161, at 317.
186. Id.
187. Id. at 317–18.
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responsibility.188 “The court decided that if the plaintiffs could prove that it was
more likely than not that they were injured by caps manufactured by one of the
named defendants, they would satisfy the causation element of their cases.”189
Put differently, “the court held that if the blasting cap manufacturers and their
association had ‘joint or group control of the risk,’ liability could be imposed on
each of the manufacturers without the need to show which manufacturer had
produced the caps that caused the injuries.”190
A fourth and similar alternate form is market-share liability, which arose
from another DES case in which the Supreme Court of California “found that all
existing alternative forms of liability, including alternative liability, concert of
action, and enterprise liability, were inappropriate.”191 In the 1980 case of
Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories,192 multiple plaintiffs “were unable to prove which
of more than one hundred DES manufacturers had produced the pills” that were
alleged to have caused their injuries.193 To address the plaintiffs’ inability to
prove cause-in-fact, the court adopted a new theory: “if the plaintiffs join as
defendants a number of manufacturers who together provided DES to a
substantial share of the relevant market, each defendant will be held liable for
the proportion of the judgment represented by its share of the market.”194 The
Sindell decision created a new “burden-shifting approach” that was intended to
188. Id. at 318.
189. Id.
190. Madden &Holian, supra note 173, at 793. The authors go on to say:
. . . The enterprise liability theory is thus a hybrid theory combining elements of alternative
liability and concert of action. More specifically enterprise liability: (1) incorporates the
alternative liability requirement that, in regard to the plaintiff, each actor is at fault; and (2)
provides that the group’s pursuits through their trade association provide circumstantial
evidence of a concert of action.
The most significant limitation on the enterprise liability approach . . . is the court’s quite
specific comment that the theory was only suited to claims involving a small group of
defendants.
Id.
191. Firak, supra note 161, at 320.
192. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924, 939–40 (Cal. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912
(1980).
193. Firak, supra note 161, at 320.
194. Id. The author goes on to note:
The Sindell court was not clear on whether plaintiffs would recover 100% of their damages, or
only that percentage of damages that was equal to the market shares of the defendants. That
is, it is not clear whether defendants’ relative market shares would satisfy 100% of plaintiffs’
damages. This question raised the possibility that the named defendants, whose combined
share of the market was less than 100%, could nevertheless be liable to plaintiffs for 100% of
their injuries. That issue was later resolved in Brown v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 3d 1049, 751
P.2d 470, 245 Cal. Rptr. 412 (1988), in which the California Supreme Court decided that the
liability of the defendants would be several and limited only to the actual market share each
held, even where the consequence would be that the plaintiff would not recover 100% of her
damages.
Id. at 320 n.59 (citing Brown v. Superior Court, 751 P.2d 470, 485 (Cal. 1988)).
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conform to the specific facts of the case and others like it.195 Professor Firak
notes that “market share liability has been severely criticized” for undermining
“traditional cause-in-fact prerequisites,” with few jurisdictions adopting the
approach “and then almost exclusively in DES cases.”196
A fifth and final way that courts have dealt with tortfeasor indeterminacy is
through risk contribution liability.197 In a 1984 Wisconsin DES case, Collins v.
Eli Lilly,198 the court rejected alternative liability, concert of action liability, and
enterprise liability as inappropriate in a DES case.199 However, the court also
rejected the market share approach of the Sindell decision on the basis that “the
large number of producers, the long period of time of production, the fluid nature
of the market, and the lack of accurate records made it practically difficult for a
plaintiff to precisely define and prove any individual defendant’s market
share.”200 To prevent the plaintiffs from going prospectively uncompensated,
the court instead adopted a law review- suggested “risk contribution theory”201
that “allows a plaintiff to proceed against a single [or multiple] defendant[s],
even if that defendant held an insignificant percentage of the market, and to
recover from that defendant in proportion to the amount of risk it created to all
consumers.”202 Professor Firak explains:

195. Madden & Holian, supra note 173, at 797. The authors go on to describe the approach as
follows:
Burden-shifting would be fair and warranted, Justice Mosk wrote, upon a plaintiff’s predicate
showing that: (1) the injury causing substance caused his injury; (2) the injury causing product
was fungible; (3) the plaintiff could define a relevant market for the injury causing product;
and (4) the plaintiff had joined as defendants a substantial share of the defendant producers
that had sold DES during the pertinent time period, i.e., the time during which the mother was
pregnant and taking DES. Upon satisfaction of this evidentiary burden, the burden would shift
to the defendants to demonstrate individually that they had not produced the DES that the
mother had taken. Upon such a showing, a defendant would not be liable. Defendants unable
to exculpate themselves would be liable for any plaintiff’s proven harm in an amount
proportionate to the defendant’s share of the market during the relevant time period.
Id.
196. Firak, supra note 161, at 321.
197. Id. at 321–23.
198. Collins v. Eli Lilly, 342 N.W.2d 37, 47 (Wis. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 826 (1984).
199. Firak, supra note 161, at 321.
200. Id. at 322.
201. Id. at 322 nn.61 & 74. Risk contribution theory was first proposed in Robinson, Multiple
Causation in Tort Law, 68 VA. L. REV. 713, 752 (1982) (stating that sensible deterrence theory
“suggests that if one tortfeasor can be identified, and his or her contribution to risk of injury can be
established, all other things being equal, that tortfeasor should be held liable to extent of contribution”).
The Collins court adopted a modified form of the Robinson proposal. See Glen O. Robinson,
Probabilistic Causation and Compensation for Tortious Risk, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 779, 782 n.13 (1985)
(arguing for a risk-based theory of liability).
202. Firak, supra note 161, at 322–23.
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According to the risk contribution theory, the wrongful conduct is the
creation of a risk to the market-at-large rather than the injury the
defendant may have inflicted on the plaintiff. In other words, creation
of a risk of the kind that caused plaintiff’s injury is enough to meet the
cause-in-fact requirement under this theory of liability.203
While each of the above-described alternate forms of liability is helpful in
providing recourse to plaintiffs confronting defendant indeterminacy in a variety
of circumstances, they all do so only by creating avenues to joint and/or several
liability against one or more prospective defendants.204 None of these
approaches, however, provides for singular and complete liability against an
organizational or corporate defendant where only a possibly-indeterminate
subset of individual actors within the organization or corporation are causally
responsible for causing the harm, or creating the risk of that harm occurring.205
That is the circumstance presented by today’s team health care. As we have now
discussed at some length, the very nature of today’s institutionally-provided team
health care potentiates a complex montage of interacting individual, group, and
system errors that sometimes results in harm.206 In such circumstance, a need
for single-point organizational accountability remains. For this, we must look to
viable theories of “institutional liability.”
b.

Institutional Liability for Medical Negligence

The IOM found that psychologist James Reason’s error research,
which explains why damage-causing failures occur in complex
systems, including aviation and nuclear power, could also be used to
understand medical errors. Reason’s ‘Swiss Cheese Model,’
recognizes that complex system failures are usually the result of
multiple weaknesses in the process chain. These weaknesses, called
‘latent failures,’ do not individually cause damage. However, latent
failures acting together can lead to damage at the end of the process
chain. When damage occurs, the final error, which Reason terms the

203. Id. at 323. Professor Firak further explains that the Collins court emphasized that:
[T]he plaintiff need not prove that a defendant produced or marketed the precise DES taken
by plaintiff’s mother. Rather, the plaintiff need only establish by a preponderance of the
evidence that a defendant produced or marketed the type (e.g., color, shape, markings, size,
or other identifiable characteristics) of DES taken by the plaintiff’s mother; the plaintiff
need not allege or prove any facts related to the time or geographic distribution of the
subject DES.
Id. at 323 n.77.
204. Id. at 317–19.
205. Id.
206. See supra Part II. Section A.1–2.
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‘triggering event’ or ‘active failure’ is easily identified, while the
latent failures go unnoticed.
As predicted by Reason’s Swiss Cheese Model, when failures occur
in a healthcare system, an individual provider’s actions or inactions
(active errors) are easily identified following a patient injury. As a
result, individual providers become the targets of medical malpractice
litigation, while the systemic failures go unnoticed and unaddressed.
According to the IOM, isolation of individual provider negligence as
the cause of the patient injury will not effectively prevent future errors,
because (1) the provider’s negligence can be caused or induced by a
combination of latent errors unlikely to repeat, and (2) failing to
address the latent errors allows them to accumulate making the system
more error-prone. Likewise, targeting only individual providers in
medical malpractice litigation fails to identify latent errors, fails to
hold healthcare organizations accountable for systemic failures, and
promotes a culture of individual blame in healthcare, all of which
threaten patient safety.207
The door to institutional liability for medical negligence first began to open
with the 1957 New York Court of Appeals decision in Bing v. Thunig,208 which
predicated a finding of hospital vicarious liability “based on the negligence of its
healthcare provider employees through the doctrine [of] respondeat superior.”209
Prior to that decision, hospitals in the United States – most of which were (and
remain) nonprofit organizations210 – “were generally immune from liability for
the allegedly negligent conduct of their nurses and physicians under the
charitable immunity doctrine.”211 However in Bing, the court articulated “a
modern view of hospitals” that dictated a different result:

207. Duffourc, supra note 109, at 22–23 (citing James Reason, Human Error: Models and
Management, 320 BMJ 768, 769 (2000)).
208. 143 N.E.2d 3 (N.Y. 1957)
209. Duffourc, supra note 109, at 24 (citing Bing, 143 N.E.2d at 8). The doctrine of respondeat
superior is defined as “the doctrine making an employer or principal liable for the wrong of an employee
or agent if it was committed within the scope of employment or agency.” Respondeat Superior,
MERRIAM-WEBSTER, https://www.merriam-webster.com/legal/respondeat%20superior (last visited Feb.
5, 2020).
210. See generally Corbett, supra note 3, at 109–20 (discussing how the ACA changed institutional
health care in the United States and how an increase in Americans with health insurance will lead to a
decrease in the need for charity care).
211. Jane Elaine Ballerini, The Apparent Agency Doctrine in Connecticut’s Medical Malpractice
Jurisprudence: Using Legal Doctrine as a Platform for Change, 13 QUINNIPIAC HEALTH L. J. 317, 321
(2010). The author goes on to explain: “The justification for the exemption was based on the
characterization of non-profit hospitals as charities and on widespread presumptions about the hospitalphysician relationship.” Id. at 322. That is to say, physicians caring for patients in hospitals have
historically been viewed as independent contractors, working under their own initiatives and being

CORBETT 05 (DO NOT DELETE)

12/23/2021 10:56 AM

2021] OPERATIONALIZING THE HEALTH CARE BENEFIT CORPORATION

309

The conception that the hospital does not undertake to treat the patient,
does not undertake to act through its doctors and nurses, but
undertakes instead simply to procure them to act upon their own
responsibility, no longer reflects the fact. Present-day hospitals, as
their manner of operation plainly demonstrates, do far more than
furnish facilities for treatment. They regularly employ on a salary
basis a large staff of physicians, nurses and internes, as well as
administrative and manual workers, and they charge patients for
medical care and treatment, collecting for such services, if necessary,
by legal action. Certainly, the person who avails himself of ‘hospital
facilities’ expects that the hospital will attempt to cure him, not that
it[‘s] nurses or other employees will act on their own responsibility.212
In 1965, the Illinois Supreme Court decided Darling v. Charleston
Community Memorial Hospital, redefining “the legal relationship between
hospitals and patients.”213 There, the court “recognized for the first time a legal
cause of action for negligence based upon a duty owed by the hospital directly
to the patient rather than one that was imputed through the doctrine of respondeat
superior.”214 Arguably, a doctrine of hospital corporate negligence was born.215
Health care law author Mindy Nunez Duffourc provides a succinct summary of
the “Corporate Negligence Doctrine:”
The elements of a prima facie case of corporate negligence are: (1)
derivation (sic) [deviation] from an accepted standard of care, (2)
actual or constructive notice of the defects or procedures that created
the harm, and (3) negligent conduct that was a substantial factor in
bringing about the plaintiff’s harm. The scope of the corporate
negligence doctrine is generally limited to actions that involve
administrative and managerial decisions, as opposed to medical

solely responsible for their own conduct. Id. at 323. As long as hospitals chose their physicians with
“due care,” they were deemed to have no control over and no liability for such physicians’ actions. Id.
212. Duffourc, supra note 109, at 24 (quoting Bing v. Thunig, 143 N.E.2d 3, 8 (N.Y. 1957)).
213. Id. at 25.
214. Id. (citing Darling v. Charleston Cmty. Mem’l Hosp., 200 N.E.2d 149 (Ill. App. 1964), aff’d,
211 N.E.2d 253 (Ill. 1965)). The author goes on to explain that: “the Darling court sanctioned the use of
industry accreditation standards, state-licensing standards, and the hospital’s own regulations to
determine the applicable legal standard of care owed by the hospital. The most important of these
standards is the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Healthcare Organizations Accreditation’s
(“JCAHO”) Manual, which is used by courts to evaluate the applicable standard of care in corporate
negligence claims.” Id.
215. Id. (emphasis added). In a 1994 article, Abraham and Weiler noted that, “[t]hus far, 21 states
have adopted hospital corporate liability.” Kenneth S. Abraham & Paul C. Weiler, Enterprise Medical
Liability and the Evolution of the American Health Care System, 108 HARV. L. REV. 381, 390 n.34
(1994).
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decisions; however, courts and legislatures in different states have
interpreted the scope of the doctrine in varying degrees. The doctrine
encompasses duties to select and retain competent physicians,
maintain appropriate facilities and equipment, train and supervise
employees, and implement appropriate protocols and procedures.216
As Duffourc notes, the scope of Darling’s corporate negligence doctrine focused
primarily on a hospital’s administrative and managerial, as opposed to medical,
decisions and actions.217 The general legal view at the time continued to be that
patients’ “attending staff physicians” were independent contractors for which the
hospital had no direct or “conventional agency” liability.218 By the 1970s,
however, many state jurisdictions “created new modes of ‘imposing liability on
hospitals for the malpractice of physicians with whom they were affiliated but
whom they did not employ.’”219 Since then, “apparent agency” increasingly has
become “a prominent theory of hospital liability” as today’s team-delivered
institutional health care is seen for what it is – “an integrated system that binds
physician and provider services to the corporate control of hospitals and other
health care entities (e.g., MCO[s], HMO[s], IPA[s]).”220
According to a 2010 article by Ballerini, “about half of the states apply
agency principles to hold hospitals vicariously liable for the conduct of their
physicians, regardless of their status as employees or independent
contractors.”221 In this way, hospitals and other organizational health care
providers are coming to be held liable for medical, as well as administrative and
managerial, misfeasance. As Ballerini concludes: “the modern hospital is
viewed as an entrepreneurial venture, as well as a health care provider, and
patients are not forced to distinguish between employed and independently
contracted providers when seeking reimbursement for medical negligence.”222
In sum, then, institutional liability for medical negligence has increasingly
come to encompass not only imputed liability under respondeat superior and

216. Duffourc, supra note 109, at 26 (emphasis added).
217. Id.
218. See Ballerini, supra note 211, at 340.
219. Id.
220. See id. (emphasis added). The author goes on to note: “Apparent agency is ‘[a]n agency created
by operation of law and established by a principal’s actions that would reasonably lead a third person to
conclude that an agency exists.’ The theory is based on the Restatement (Second) of Torts section 429
. . . .” Id.
221. Ballerini, supra note 211, at 342. The author identifies these states as including: “Alaska,
Arizona, California, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi,
Missouri, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Washington,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming.” Id. at 342 n.152.
222. Id. at 343–44 (emphasis added) (citing Kenneth S. Abraham & Paul C. Weiler, Enterprise
Medical Liability and the Evolution of the American Health Care System, 108 HARV. L. REV. 381, 387
(1994)).
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apparent agency, but direct liability for an organizational health care provider’s
failure to meet the standard of care applicable to a “reasonable” like-provider.
Such failures may well now include individual-errors, group-errors, and systemerrors that today’s team-delivered health care potentiates.223 Moreover, such
liability increasingly will extend to institutional providers other than just
hospitals. As Professor Furrow opines:
[E]ven if ACOs and other entities operate without a hospital as part of
the organization, they are now health care providers, subject to
liability just as a hospital or managed care organization, on both
vicarious liability and direct negligence principles. Corporate
negligence principles will likely apply to integrated organizations that
manage care, whether a patient home, an ACO, or some other delivery
form that PPACA creates. American courts have proved willing to
look beyond the hospital form in deciding whether a health care entity
might be liable for corporate negligence. . . . The entity would, like
an HMO, ‘involve [itself] daily in decisions affecting [its] subscriber’s
medical care. These decisions may, among others, limit the length of
hospital stays, restrict the use of specialists, prohibit or limit posthospital care, restrict access to therapy, or prevent rendering of
emergency room care.’ The entity must have general responsibility
for ‘arranging and coordinating the total health care of its patients.’ It
must take ‘an active role in patients’ care.’
. . . PPACA – with its millions of dollars in demonstration grants and
its new mandates – will foster new entities that are far more likely to
coordinate care than are current health care providers. These new
entities will take on new responsibilities that will make them
appropriate defendants in tort litigation. . . . It may be that finally
enterprise liability [‘a proposal often discussed but never adopted’]
will make sense as integration and coordination intensify, and
outcomes and performance data are generally available to all.224
c.

Demise of the “Corporate Practice of Medicine” Doctrine

Having now made the point that institutional/corporate liability for medical
negligence has become increasingly well-established, it is appropriate to make
the corollary point that the common law “corporate practice of medicine
doctrine” has become increasingly moribund. That is the doctrine that

223. See Grout et al., supra note 49, at 400 (explaining the importance of “mistake proofing”
individual errors, group errors, and system errors).
224. Furrow, supra note 91, at 1773–74 (emphasis added).
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“recognized practicing physicians as distinct from conventional employees in a
business enterprise.”225 Professor Robert I. Field explains:
The doctrine is based on the notion that as professionals bound by a
code of ethics and licensing rules, physicians must honor a fiduciary
duty to their patients, and as such, should be accountable not to the
financial imperatives of a commercial employer but to their patients
directly. This reasoning led to the legal principle that physicians
should not render services as employees within corporate structures,
but only in practices that they themselves controlled or that were
controlled by professional colleagues. The doctrine thereby blocked
the development of practice arrangements through corporations
managed by nonphysicians. This result granted the profession
substantial leeway to adopt its own business structure free from
outside interference. However, once again, by gaining legal authority
to control their actions, physicians also positioned themselves as the
only accountable parties when their services failed to meet
expectations.226
Needless to say, the doctrine today runs counter to multiple trends in the
continuing evolution of the health care delivery system. As we have now
emphasized: physicians are not the only hands-on direct providers of medical
and related health care services owing “a fiduciary duty to their patients;”
physicians today practice in a multitude of settings, in a number of different
employment and/or affiliation relationships with unlicensed individuals and/or
corporate organizations; and, physicians are clearly not “the only accountable
parties when [those] services [fail] to meet expectations.” As Professor Gabriel
Scheffler has observed:
As the practice of medicine has evolved from solo practitioners to
large integrated health care organizations, the doctrine has ceased to
be enforced in most states. The Supreme Court dealt the AMA a major
setback in 1982 when it affirmed a Federal Trade Commission order
that the AMA’s ethical restraints on the corporate practice of medicine
violated the Federal Trade Commission Act. In addition, many states
have carved out explicit exceptions to the doctrine, including for nonprofit health care organizations, health care organizations owned and

225. Robert I. Field, The Malpractice Crisis Turns 175: What Lessons Does History Hold for
Reform, 4 DREXEL L. REV. 7, 28 (2011).
226. Id. at 28–29.
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managed by licensed physicians, health maintenance organizations
(HMOs), and medical schools.227
She goes on to conclude:
Over the years, many scholars have argued in favor of abolishing the
corporate practice of medicine doctrine altogether. These critics argue
that the original justifications undergirding the doctrine no longer
apply in a world in which the delivery of health care is increasingly
team-based, and where managed care companies exert influence over
how care is delivered. Rather than serving to promote quality, they
argue that the corporate practice of medicine doctrine in fact degrades
the quality of health care by making our health care delivery system
more fragmented. Critics argue that the corporate practice of
medicine doctrine contributes to this fragmentation by preventing
health care organizations from exerting control over physicians’
decisions and making it more difficult for health care organizations to
implement patient-safety initiatives.228
All of the above, then, segues well into our next discussion – the enterprise
liability model for organizational health care providers.
B.

Enterprise Liability Redux

In her 2014 article, Professor Hermer states:
Enterprise liability would move the locus of liability from physicians
and other individual health care providers to the enterprise in which
or for which they work. It was most recently suggested in the 1990s,
when health maintenance and other managed care organizations were
ascending and were conceptualized as the ‘enterprise’ in question.
Although hospitals had originally been proposed as the liabilitybearer, the prospect that a health care system based on managed care
would come into being through the Clinton health reform proposal in
the 1990s prompted some to suggest that managed care organizations
should instead assume liability. William Sage, Kathleen Hastings,
and Robert Berenson argued, for example, that enterprise liability for
managed care entities paid through capitation would make managed
care entities bear the costs of substandard or inadequate care that they
227. Gabriel Scheffler, The Dynamism of Health Law: Expanded Insurance Coverage as the Engine
of Regulatory Reform, 10 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 729, 740 (2020) (citing Adam M. Freiman, The
Abandonment of the Antiquated Corporate Practice of Medicine Doctrine: Injecting a Dose of
Efficiency Into the Modern Health Care Environment, 47 EMORY L. J. 697, 706–08 (1998)).
228. Id. at 741 (emphasis added).

CORBETT 05 (DO NOT DELETE)

314

JOURNAL OF HEALTH CARE LAW & POLICY

12/23/2021 10:56 AM

[VOL. 24:2

might otherwise be tempted to deliver in an effort to reduce expenses
and increase profits. Managed care plans, they argued, have the ability
to coordinate providers, manage health care delivery, and oversee
quality, making it both economically and practically efficient for them
to bear liability.
The Clinton health reform plan was never enacted, so the health
coverage landscape that Sage and his co-authors contemplated did not
come into being. With the ACA, we now have a different landscape.
Health plans are not being asked to tightly manage and oversee care;
rather, groups of providers are, via clusters of demonstration projects
involving care coordinated through delivery or financing innovations.
ACOs constitute one such demonstration project, and arguably are the
best suited of the different proposed models to support a system of
enterprise liability.229
In our 2019 article, we observed that ACOs and our purposed HCBC share
an “affinity of purposes.”230 That affinity derives from the fact that both strive
to “transform the current fragmented delivery system into an integrated and
coordinated care model that consistently produces improved quality, greater
accessibility, and lower cost” by effecting “greater collaboration between and
among [ ] disparate system participants.”231 While we do not envision the HCBC
form necessarily being used exclusively for the operation of ACOs, we do
suggest that it would be ideally-suited for such purpose – and thus for adoption
of enterprise liability, as Professor Hermer urges.
We must first, however, clarify what is meant (or at least what we mean)
by “enterprise liability” in this context. It is not just another name for “industrywide liability,” as Madden and Holian seemingly proclaim in their 2007

229. Hermer, supra note 95, at 293–94 (emphasis added). In a 1997 article, Professor William M
Sage explained:
Despite its theoretical promise, the Clinton Administration’s enterprise liability proposal fell
flat. The concept came into public view as a ‘trial Balloon’ of the Administration’s health
care task force in April 1993, immediately floated into a storm of opposition, and quickly
proved leaden. Intended both as a policy-based imposition of responsibility on managed care
plans in recognition of their expanded role, and as a political benefit to doctors who would be
liberated from the threat of individual lawsuits, enterprise liability provoked a reaction that
took its proponents by surprise. In retrospect, the criticism related less to the proposal per se
than to what its announcement indicated about the direction of change in the American health
care system.
William M. Sage, Enterprise Liability and the Emerging Managed Health Care System, 60 LAW AND
CONTEMP. PROBS. 159, 169 (1997).
230. Corbett, supra note 17, at 337.
231. Corbett, supra note 3, at 165–66.
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article.232 Neither is it a “no fault” or “strict liability” approach, such as Professor
Furrow discusses in a 2012 article – a “pure enterprise-liability approach”
wherein “a compensation obligation arises from the mere occurrence” of a harmcausing adverse event, without any need for showing “avoidability” or “error”
(i.e., negligence).233 Rather, it is a model based on a policy proposal originally
developed by Professors Kenneth S. Abraham and Paul C. Weiler in the late
1980s – the rationale for which they articulated in a 1994 Harvard Law Review
Article.234
1. The Enterprise Liability Model of Abraham and Weiler
The current ferment over reform of our health care system has led to
a rethinking of the relations between this country’s health care and
civil justice systems. Since the time when the traditional individual
liability approach to malpractice crystallized, the manner in which
health care is delivered has changed enormously. From a group of
isolated individual practitioners who used hospitals as workshops for
themselves and hotels for their patients, the system has evolved to the
point where care is now delivered mainly under the auspices of large
enterprises such as health insurers, hospitals, and HMOs. Yet the
liability regime has remained geared to an older world of individual
delivery of health care, a world that is on the verge of disappearing.
The time has come to renovate our system of liability to make it better
suited to a new world dominated by health care enterprises. The
enterprise liability model we have developed is designed for precisely
this purpose.235
Early in their article, the authors note that tort law scholars have sought to
expand tort liability for personal injury to “the enterprise in the best position to
make risk/safety tradeoffs” for more than fifty years.236 Even in 1994, they saw
their proposal as constituting “a significant but logical extension of trends that
have been evolving over several decades in both the allocation of legal
responsibility for negligently caused patient injuries and the increasingly

232. See Madden & Holian, supra note 173, at 792–793. The authors there characterize enterprise
liability as being: “ . . . a hybrid theory combining elements of alternative liability and concert of action.
More specifically enterprise liability: (1) incorporates the alternative liability requirement that, in regard
to the plaintiff, each actor is at fault; and (2) provides that the group’s pursuits through their trade
association provide circumstantial evidence of a concert of action.” Id. at 793.
233. See Barry R. Furrow, Adverse Events and Patient Injury: Coupling Detection, Disclosure, and
Compensation, 46 NEW ENG. L. REV. 437, 470–71 (2012).
234. See Abraham & Weiler, supra note 54, at 381.
235. Id. at 436.
236. Id. at 384.
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commercialized organization of health care.”237 For all of the reasons we have
now discussed, their assertion is all the more true today.
They provide a succinct summary of their concept’s essential elements:
Under our proposal, as under present-day vicarious, agency, and
corporate liability theories, the malpractice of physicians and other
health care personnel would remain a prerequisite to the imposition
of liability on the hospital. In contrast to these existing forms of
liability, however, hospitals under enterprise liability would be the
exclusive bearers of medical liability for all malpractice claims
brought by hospitalized patients – regardless of the provider’s status
as employee, independent contractor, or holder of admitting
privileges, and regardless of the site of the provider’s malpractice. In
turn, physicians would be insulated from, or at least insured against,
personal liability to injured patients, in the same way as are nurses
and other medical staff working for hospitals under the current legal
regime.238
A few points from this summary warrant particular emphasis: first, their proposal
is not for a “no fault” or “strict liability” approach – a showing of negligence
(i.e., malpractice) is still required; second, they anticipate arrangements through
which the (hospital) enterprise would become the sole (“exclusive”) party who
could be held liable for a patient’s medical malpractice claim; third, the
enterprise liability extends to the malpractice of “other health care personnel,”
not just physicians; and fourth, they contemplate use of appropriate means to
protect physicians from “personal liability” (i.e, “insulated from, or at least
insured against”) – just as the hospital’s employed personnel have traditionally
been under conventional institutional liability insurance coverage.239
Although ACOs were not even on the horizon at the time of Abraham and
Weiler’s 1994 article, their expectations for the future were nonetheless
prescient:
As the cost of care becomes even more important to all health care
providers because of the manner in which competition is shaping the
process of health care delivery, both physicians and hospitals will
increasingly find themselves linked in health care provider ‘networks’
designed to assure the most cost-efficient provision of care. Such
networks will be supervised by the enterprises that contract with
patients, who likely will be purchasing coverage in sizable groups
with correspondingly greater market power. The economic interests
237. Id. at 385.
238. Id. at 393–94 (emphasis added).
239. Id.
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of different individual and enterprise health care providers will be
linked, and their relationships increasingly regulated by a series of
contracts between and among patients, individual physicians,
hospitals, HMOs, and insurance companies. The transformation of
health care delivery from a free-standing professional pursuit into an
integrated economic enterprise will then be one step closer to
completion; accordingly, the old justifications for focusing
malpractice liability on individual physicians will have largely
disappeared.240
This is an entirely accurate description of the present environment that has
brought about the ACA, it’s ACOs, and now our proposed HCBC. Moreover,
we agree with their contention that “enterprise medical liability” (“EML”)
“would be a more sensible system of compensating injured patients, a more
economical method of administering such compensation, and a more effective
vehicle for prevention of medical injury than the current system of individual
liability for malpractice.”241
Near the end of their article, Abraham and Weiler “sketch the outlines of
an EML ‘experiment.’”242 They suggest a legislative approach, wherein a state
legislature authorizes “hospitals to elect EML on the following terms:”
(a) Any hospital electing EML would be liable to its patients for
malpractice by any affiliated physician, nurse, or other individual
provider, whether or not the provider was a hospital employee. The
hospital would assume liability for all patients treated by its affiliated
physicians, whether or not those patients were ever admitted to the
hospital.
(b) Patients would be given clear notice, both by the physician’s
office and by the EML hospital’s admitting branch, of the hospital’s
expanded liability and the resulting immunity of its affiliated
physicians.
(c) Individual health care providers would be relieved of liability for
malpractice, with an exception for injuries caused by a health care
provider who acted with intent to cause harm or with reckless
indifference to the welfare of the patient.

240. Id. at 398 (emphasis added).
241. Id. at 399.
242. Id. at 426.
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(d) All individual physicians relieved of malpractice liability by a
hospital’s election of EML would be obligated to pay the hospital an
annual surcharge in order to reimburse the hospital for the anticipated
increase in its malpractice insurance costs. The surcharge would take
into account the anticipated reduction in malpractice insurance costs
charged the physician.
(e) The amount of the surcharges would be set by agreement between
each participating hospital and its affiliated physicians. Surcharge
levels would be reviewable by the state’s Commissioner of Insurance
on the same basis that the Commissioner may now review medical
malpractice premium levels. In most states new rates can be filed and
may be used unless the Commissioner formally objects. Ideally, each
physician could designate a single hospital to be his or her ‘primary’
hospital and pay a surcharge to that hospital alone. Alternatively,
separate surcharge rates could be set for physicians affiliated with
more than one hospital so that these providers would not be required
to pay excessive duplicate surcharges.
(f) As another alternative, hospitals and affiliated physicians, through
negotiations with health insurers and other third-party payers, could
arrange adjustments in the charges for services and reimbursement
rates payable for medical and hospital services to take account of the
shift in liability resulting from elective EML.
(g) Hospitals electing EML would be required, to the extent that they
had not already done so, to set up peer review mechanisms to ensure
that quality care is provided. Such peer review mechanisms would
have to include procedures for revoking the admitting privileges of
physicians who fail to comply with the hospital’s standards.243
While we would not necessarily agree with the inclusion of each of these
“terms” exactly as they propose, we do agree with their broad strokes. We also
agree with the idea of a state-legislated “enabling statute” to effectuate an
organizational health care provider’s adoption of enterprise medical liability.
However, we have an additional suggestion. We have already addressed in our
2019 article the fact that “enabling legislation” to create the HCBC must occur
at the state level (albeit with necessary waivers from, or exceptions to, certain
federal laws governing taxes and health care operations);244 we would
accordingly argue that the state enabling legislation for effectuating enterprise

243. Id. at 427–28.
244. Corbett, supra note 17, at 326–27.
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medical liability should be included (expressly or by reference) into that state’s
HCBC legislation itself, thereby making EML a constitutive part of the HCBC’s
statutory structure.
In addition, we would urge that such statute require that any organization
adopting the HCBC form accept enterprise liability for any breach of its
institutional fiduciary duties to its patients, as well as for any breaches of
fiduciary duties arguably owed by any of its non-professional staff. That is to
say, under the “broader fiduciary duties” of the Fiduciary Medicine Model that
Professor Matthew (and we) advocate, one does not have to be a “licensed
medical provider” – technically susceptible to a “medical malpractice” claim for
violating an applicable “professional standard of care” – to have actionable
fiduciary duties to patients.245 Thus, the administrative, managerial, and/or other
systemic errors of unlicensed personnel that result in harm to patients should also
create grounds for the HCBC’s enterprise liability for fiduciary breach (itself an
actionable tort246).247
2. Continuing Academic Support for Enterprise Medical Liability
Since Abraham and Weiler’s 1994 article, a number of health law scholars
have continued to endorse the idea of enterprise medical liability. In a 1996
article, author Jack K. Kilcullen, after discussing the rationale for imposing
liability on a manufacturer in a product liability case, wrote the following:
Enterprise liability can address similar problems posed by medical
care. Medical treatment is the product of a network of trained
individuals, many of whom have no contact with the patient. Thus,
the individuals may not have a traditional duty of care toward the
patient, yet their negligence can have devastating consequences. In
addition, patients lack the bargaining power to negotiate all aspects of
treatment, where, for example, they may consent to procedure without
full comprehension of the procedure and its risks. Consequently, the
medical enterprise is superiorly placed to manage both the risk and to
distribute its costs in compensating anyone injured from its wellintended efforts.248
245. See generally Matthew, supra note 146 (proposing the Fiduciary Medicine Model to expand
and refine fiduciary law in health care policy).
246. See generally Deborah A. DeMott, Breach of Fiduciary Duty: On Justifiable Expectations of
Loyalty and Their Consequences, 48 ARIZ. L. REV. 925 (2006) (expounding on the notion of loyalty to
inform fiduciary duty in tort law). See previous discussion at supra Part III Section A.1.b. about
fiduciary breach itself being an actionable tort.
247. See supra Part III. Section A.1.b.
248. Jack K. Kilcullen, Groping for the Reins: ERISA, HMO Malpractice, and Enterprise Liability,
22 AM. J. L. & MED. 7, 14–15 (1996) (emphasis added). The author later goes on to say:
The sheer complexity of modern health care, both administratively and technologically, is as James
would describe:
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Furthermore, in a 1997 article, Professor William M. Sage noted:
A considerable part of the debate over enterprise liability comes down
to the question of the appropriate unit for accountability in modern
health care. Traditionally, control – and therefore blame – rested with
individual physicians. Today, however, there is increasing evidence
that most errors in health care delivery, while human in proximate
cause, are ultimately the result of faulty institutional processes. In this
respect, health care is beginning to mirror other industries more than
adherents to a purely professional model would like to admit. . . .249
Additionally, in 2002, Professor Thomas R. McLean wrote:
If in the twenty-first century health care delivery is to be based upon
a multidisciplinary team approach to control health care costs, patients
will be receiving a greater proportion of their health care from
individuals with less formal training than the current physician
providers. Assertions that as a group, physician extenders provided
the same quality of health care as physicians are unsupported by hard
statistical data. Moreover, collaborative multidisciplinary health care
delivery, because it inserts another caregiver between the physician
and the patient, of necessity increases the complexity of our health
care system, thereby increasing the potential number of handoff
errors. Thus, the unassailable corollary of implementation of
collaborative multidisciplinary medicine to cut health care costs is that
it will be less safe than our autonomous physician-based approach.
...
In short, to ensure that the standard of medical care is not lowered by
a national decision to facilitate collaborative multidisciplinary health
care delivery, the country must be prepared to move to enterprise
liability for health care delivery.250

[A]n enterprise . . . beneficial to many, which takes a more or less inevitable accident toll of
human life and limb . . . where the accident victims are as a class economically ill-equipped to
carry the burden of serious accident losses. The impact of such losses on the individual in
terms of human hardship is often crushing and the repercussions of this blow reach far beyond
the individual and pose a significant social problem.
Id. at 47 (citing James Fleming, Jr., General Products – Should Manufacturers Be Liable Without
Negligence?, 24 TENN. L. REV. 923, 923 (1957)).
249. Sage, supra note 229, at 195.
250. Thomas R. McLean, Crossing the Quality Chasm: Autonomous Physician Extenders Will
Necessitate a Shift to Enterprise Liability Coverage for Health Care Delivery, 12 HEALTH MATRIX 239,
291, 295 (2002). The author also notes:
Crossing the Quality Chasm is not the first report to Congress advocating the adoption of
enterprise liability, which is a method to shift liability for adverse events, occurring during the
delivery of health care, from the individual physician to the business organization that provided
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Moreover, in a 2008 article, Professor Philip G. Peters, Jr. urged:
Exclusive hospital enterprise liability has the potential to revive the
dormant deterrent power of tort law. The reasons are simple. Unlike
individual physicians, hospitals are experience-rated repeat players
who have the vantage point and the resources needed to recognize and
implement systematic improvements in the process of delivering
health care. Adoption of enterprise liability would align the incentives
of tort law with the goals of modem patient safety advocates who
emphasize the need to shift our focus from the blaming of individual
wrongdoers to the design of systems that anticipate and prevent
human error. Exclusive enterprise liability would also reduce the
disruption caused by the insurance cycle, spare high-risk specialists
from shouldering a disproportionate share of health care’s liability
costs, reduce litigation costs that arise in multi-defendant lawsuits, and
dampen the extraordinary anger of practicing physicians. The time
has come to adopt hospital enterprise liability.251
In addition, Peters also observed:
Because the benefits of enterprise liability far outweigh its
disadvantages, many respected health law scholars endorsed it. They
include Clark Havighurst, Paul Weiler, Troyen Brennan, Michelle
Mello, David Studdert, Tom Baker, and William Sage. Although
these scholars differed on a number of issues, like the choice between
the medical service. However, although enterprise liability is conceptually no more than a
natural extension of corporate liability, enterprise liability is a slippery concept because of
polymorphic definitions. However, if enterprise liability is defined as a system under which a
business organization that provides a medical service is the exclusive bearer of liability for all
medical negligence, regardless of the provider’s status, then enterprise liability is the superior
method by which to assign liability if physician extenders are to be granted greater autonomy.
Moreover, by focusing all litigation against a single party, it is hoped that enterprise liability
is a more just and cost efficient system than the traditional indemnity medical malpractice
system.
Id. at 275–76 (emphasis added).
251. Philip G. Peters, Jr., Resuscitating Hospital Enterprise Liability, 73 MO. L. REV. 369, 370
(2008) (emphasis added). He goes on to say:
Lawmakers should recognize that hospital enterprise liability will shift legal responsibility onto
actors who are better positioned to detect opportunities for safety improvement and better
financed to act upon those insights. Because hospitals are experience-rated or self-insured,
enterprise liability will create a greatly enhanced financial incentive to undertake those safety
improvements. At the same time, the shift of liability from individual physicians to hospital
systems is likely to loosen current physician resistance to promising patient safety initiatives.
For all of these reasons, we urgently need to modernize the law of malpractice liability by
making hospitals exclusively liable. Lives, not to mention lawsuits, literally hang in the
balance.
Id. at 385.
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hospitals and managed care organizations as the responsible
‘enterprise,’ they agreed on the need for institutional, rather than
individual, responsibility. They shared the belief that health care
quality would improve if organizations had a legal incentive to
minimize medical accidents.252
As our final example, in her 2013 article writer Jessica S. Allain suggests
that the continued proliferation of artificial intelligence systems like Watson
provides further impetus for a system of enterprise liability:
The law currently is a conglomeration of legal regimes that do not
clearly apply to artificial intelligence systems. As a result, different
courts could apply different theories to similar cases, leading to
inconsistent results. A streamlined method for assessing liability
against artificial intelligence systems will likely encourage this
technology’s use. For instance, removing doubts about who will be
liable and to what extent the responsible party will be financially
responsible if these systems malfunction will likely encourage
hospitals to adopt this emerging technology. Additionally, cases
involving Watson will necessarily involve a team of supporting
physicians. Distinguishing fault and causation between the actors for
a traditional comparative fault analysis can be a very complex inquiry.
A regime based on enterprise liability combining elements of medical
malpractice, products liability, and vicarious liability will adequately
address the legal challenges raised by Watson while ensuring fairness
and consistency between courts.253
Additional examples of continuing scholarly support for enterprise liability
could be given, but would only serve to belabor the point.254 In view of the
continuing evolution of the health care delivery system into ever-larger and more
complex clinically and/or financially-integrated organizational providers,
adoption of enterprise medical liability is now more than ever a compelling idea
for which the HCBC would (by design) be particularly well-suited.

252. Id. at 375; see also Philip G. Jr. Peters, Health Courts, 88 B.U. L. REV. 227, 278-286 (2008)
(providing a detailed discussion of the advantages of enterprise liability).
253. Allain, supra note 72, at 1073.
254. See, e.g., Thomas R. McLean, Cybersecurity - An Argument for Enterprise Liability, 23 J.
LEGAL MED. 167, 169 (2002) (arguing that adopting enterprise liability for cybersurgery would “provide
consistent compensation to worthy plaintiffs”); Mello & Studdert, supra note 104, at 620 (arguing that
“doctrinal realignment” of the tort system “requires the development of a more robust role for enterprise
liability”); Mantel, supra note 87, at 515–17, 517 n.275 (citing several other authors and their arguments
in favor of enterprise medical liability).
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IV. THE HCBC AS LIABILITY AND HEALTH INSURER
We have argued that the HCBC is a preferred legal form for large,
integrated health care delivery systems wishing to improve quality and
accessibility while simultaneously lowering costs and restoring patient trust – all
objectives shared in common with ACOs under the ACA. Accordingly, while
we would not necessarily expect all HCBCs to operate as ACOs, we would hope
that many ACOs would see the value in operating as HCBCs. In any event, both
entities will be confronted with the question of how to best deal with the issue of
their own ongoing institutional medical and fiduciary liability:
There are many questions that remain unanswered in terms of ACO
malpractice liability: Will ACOs maintain liability insurance? Will
they self-insure? What will be the most popular legal structure of the
statutory options available? In other words, will most ACOs organize
as corporations, partnerships, limited liability companies or some
other state recognized legal structure? Will individual ACO
physicians and providers serve as employees, independent contractors
or in some other legal capacity? How will liability work with regard
to the governing board of ACOs? How will liability be distributed
between individual ACO providers and the ACO entity for malpractice
committed by an individual ACO physician or provider? How will
the concept of joint and several liability function within the ACO
context? These are all open questions that will have to be answered
in the future.255
In our opinion, an institutional health care provider’s adoption of the HCBC form
and formal acceptance of exclusive enterprise liability for its prospective
malpractice and fiduciary liabilities would arguably go a long way toward
accomplishing our quality, accessibility, fairness, and trust objectives; however,
to the extent that such providers simply rely on the commercial insurance market
for liability coverage, minimizing the overhead costs associated with such
coverage remains another matter.
A.

The HCBC as Liability Insurer

It is not our intent to enter the decades-long and still-continuing debate over
whether or not the existing medical malpractice system is plagued by “frivolous”
lawsuits that require and justify caps on plaintiffs’ damages and/or other kinds
of limitations on plaintiffs’ ability to adjudicate claims. We again openly
acknowledge our bias – that such “reform” efforts are misplaced and have little
255. Christopher Smith, Between the Scylla and Charybdis: Physicians and the Clash of Liability
Standards and Cost Cutting Goals within Accountable Care Organizations, 20 ANNALS HEALTH L. 165,
195 (2011) (emphasis added).
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salutary effect on overall system performance or costs. Rather, we wish to more
closely and critically examine the still-predominating for-profit, third-party,
commercial liability insurance system – and suggest a more cost-effective
approach. We again begin with the observations of Professor Philip G. Peters,
Jr.:
Liability insurance premium levels go through periodic peaks and
troughs that are called ‘the insurance cycle.’ Although the magnitude
of the peaks can be exacerbated by underlying trends in the number of
claims being filed and the size of settlement payouts, the cycle itself is
fueled by factors that are not related to claims experience. The cycle
typically involves a period of relative stability or even shrinking of
real premium levels as insurers compete on the basis of price to
increase their market share and to obtain funds to invest until claims
against their insureds are resolved. When changes in the investment
returns, reserve levels, or legal markets warrant an increase in
premiums, insurers have historically been loath to be the first to do so.
As a result, corrections are delayed until price increases are essential
to the company’s survival. When the correction occurs, it must
account for years of inappropriately low premiums. This correction
of accumulated under-pricing caused the sharp premium spikes that
occurred in the mid-1970s, mid-1980s, and early 2000s and prompted
physicians to march on state capitals across the country. It is no
coincidence that the periodic escalation of angry demands for medical
malpractice reform always follows a spike in the cycle. Any
malpractice reform that hopes to end these crises must temper the
impact of these inevitable premium spikes on individual physicians.256
As Abraham and Weiler point out, malpractice liability is governed by state
law; insurance premiums are “subject to state regulation;” the commercial
insurer’s “risk pool for purposes of loss-prediction and premium-setting” is
limited to the number of physicians practicing in the state; and, the insurers
divide those physicians into “risk classes” based on their specialties, regardless
of their personal claims experience.257 Consequently, “a comparatively small
number of physicians comprising each pool is charged with the aggregate cost of
this risk.”258 As a result, high-risk specialists incur higher premiums than other
physicians in the same area. 259 Moreover, when premiums inevitably increase,
they do so sharply – resulting in unforeseen reductions in income and cash-flow

256.
257.
258.
259.

Peters, supra note 251, at 386–87 (emphasis added).
Abraham & Weiler, supra note 54, at 401.
Id. at 401–02.
Id. at 402.
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problems for many physicians.260 “These shocks in the market for malpractice
coverage produce not only economic effects, but also political repercussions that
generate ill-designed tort reform of various sorts.”261
As indicated in our initial quote of Professor Peters, an exclusive enterprise
liability approach is preferable since, unlike physicians, hospitals are
“experience-rated repeat players” (as would be other institutional providers, like
ACOs and our proposed HCBC); moreover, “[e]xclusive enterprise liability
would also reduce the disruption caused by the insurance cycle . . . .”262 As
Abraham and Weiler argue:
EML would be a superior compensation system from the standpoint
of both physicians and claimants. For physicians, shifting liability
from individual physicians to hospital enterprises could ameliorate the
effect of sharp changes in premium levels that result from the small
size of insurer risk pools. Each liability-bearing enterprise would
serve, in effect, as a large pool consisting of the risks posed by all the
doctors and nurses for whose malpractice the enterprise would be
liable. For claimants, and especially those who suffered severe and
permanent injuries, EML would virtually eliminate the risk that a large
judgment would go unrecovered.
In addition, EML could prove to be a superior insurance system from
the standpoint of hospitals. Though some hospitals now self-insure
their liability for malpractice, this practice probably would be
rendered more feasible by enterprise liability, because the increased
number of events for which hospitals would be liable would render
their annual claims experience even more predictable. Moreover,
whether a hospital self-insures or purchases market insurance,
hospitals are better able to plan and budget for the variable costs of
malpractice insurance than are individual physicians or small practice
groups.263

260. Id.
261. Id. (emphasis added). The authors go on to note:
For example, during both the medical malpractice ‘crisis’ of the mid-1970s and the liability
‘crisis’ of the mid-1980s, physicians and other potential defendants were often successful in
persuading state legislatures to enact their favored tort reforms. For catalogues of the results,
see Joseph Sanders & Craig Joyce, ‘Off to the Races’: The 1980s Tort Crisis and the Law
Reform Process, 27 HOUS. L. REV. 207, 218-23 (1990), and Comment, An Analysis of State
Legislative Responses to the Medical Malpractice Crisis, 1975 DUKE L.J. 1417 passim.
Id. at 420 n.78.
262. Peters, supra note 251, at 369–70.
263. Abraham & Weiler, supra note 54, 403–04 (emphasis added).
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Although now made more than 25 years ago, Abraham and Weiler’s
arguments remain persuasive today.
1.

The Self-Insurance/Captive Option

In a 2012 article, Professor Eleanor D. Kinney notes:
In recent years, healthcare providers have increasingly used captive
insurance companies for their medical liability coverage. Over the
past several years, an increasing number of individual hospitals and
consortia of hospitals and physicians have begun to self-insure in a
variety of ways. In 2003, the American Hospital Association
estimated that forty percent of its member hospitals were self-insured.
A more recent industry survey conducted by AON Risk Solutions and
the American Society for Healthcare Risk Management ‘found that 73
percent of systems surveyed will self-insure the combined hospitalphysician malpractice risk.’264
According to Kinney, the Captive Insurance Companies Association
“defines captive insurers as follows:”
Captive Insurance Company – A risk-financing method or form of
self-insurance involving the establishment of a subsidiary corporation
or association organized to write insurance. Captive insurance
companies are formed to serve the insurance needs of the parent
organization and to escape uncertainties of commercial insurance
availability and cost. The insureds have a direct involvement and
influence over the company’s major operations, including
underwriting, claims, management policy, and investments.265

264. Eleanor D. Kinney, The Potential of Captive Medical Liability Insurance Carriers and Damage
Caps for Real Malpractice Reform, 46 NEW ENG. L. REV. 489, 498 (2012) (citing, Healthcare Industry
Faces Unprecedented Change in Hospital Landscape, AON (Oct. 18, 2011),
http://aon.mediaroom.com/index.php?s=43&item=2414).
265. Id. at 495–96 (emphasis added) (citing Captives Glossary, CAPTIVE INS. COS. ASS’N,
http://www.cicaworld.com/Resources/CaptivesGlossary.aspx (last visited Mar. 30, 2012)). Professor
Kinney goes on to note:
There are two primary forms of captives: single-parent captives and group captives. In a
single-parent captive, also known as a pure captive, a parent company forms an insurance
company to insure its own risks. In a group captive, multiple, non-related organizations form
or participate in an insurance company to insure risks common to the group. Other
classifications of captives include an association captive, a ‘rent-a-captive,’ a sponsored or
‘protected cell’ captive, and a risk retention group (“RRG”).
Id. at 497 (emphasis added).
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Professor Kinney emphasizes the principal advantage of captives for
institutional health care providers: since the provider is the “only insured entity”
– able to direct all underwriting, claims, and investment decisions – they can
better “take steps to limit medical liability claims” free of a commercial carrier’s
competing interests in “serving shareholders or other insureds;” that is, because
commercial carriers “are incentivized to contest medical liability claims in
pursuit of profits or revenue” they “have little incentive to work with provider
patient safety programs in compensating patients for medical injury.”266 In
addition, she suggests that those providers wishing to develop ACOs under the
ACA (with its “multiple provisions that encourage providers to integrate their
quality improvement, patient safety, and care delivery activities”) “could greatly
benefit by the flexibility accorded by captive insurance companies managing
liability.”267
Not surprisingly, Professor Hermer also endorses the benefits of captives
for ACOs, particularly within the context of enterprise liability.268 In her
previously-quoted 2014 article, she writes:
ACOs will need to have the capacity to exercise a certain amount of
control over participating health care providers in order to more
reliably meet quality and cost targets. Given the need for such
control, it makes sense that the enterprise should bear the financial
risk of negligent medical errors, rather than the individual
practitioners acting as a part of it. . . .269
...
ACOs would be aided in [their] pursuits by self-insuring or insuring
via a captive insurance company, rather than by purchasing coverage
on the market. While self-insurance had once been more commonly
used by larger health care entities, the use of captive insurers created
by one or more business entities (parents) solely to insure the risk of
that entity or entities has grown substantially in recent years. The
parent pre-funds losses by paying premiums to the captive, which the
IRS considers a tax-deductible business expense to the parent. Thus,
rather than deducting losses as they are paid, which would be the case
under a self-insured model, the parent takes the deduction up-front.
Excess premiums can be held in reserve and invested to fund future
losses, or distributed to the parent as profit.270

266. Id. at 500 (emphasis added).
267. Id. at 499.
268. Hermer, supra note 95, at 295–96 (explaining why placing liability on the ACOs rather than on
participating physicians would accomplish multiple important goals).
269. Id. (emphasis added).
270. Id. at 297–98 (emphasis added).
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Professor Hermer then goes on to note the difference between “enterprise
liability” and “enterprise insurance,” and to explain why enterprise liability is
the preferred approach for ACOs:
Given that many of the innovations discussed above do not require the
institution of enterprise liability but instead can be done through our
present liability regime, one might ask why one might prefer
enterprise liability over, for example, enterprise insurance, where an
ACO would simply provide malpractice coverage to its participating
physicians through a captive, self-insurance, or otherwise. Enterprise
insurance is widely used by academic medical centers to cover their
faculty. It has been less common elsewhere in the health care industry,
but that may be in part because physician employment has not been as
common outside of academic medicine until more recently. As
consolidation continues in the health care sector, it is likely that
enterprise insurance will also become more common. Not only does
enterprise insurance offer improved financial benefits to larger health
care entities with an employed physician staff, but it also allows for
better risk- and quality-management.
...
Yet an ACO’s control over both risk and quality could improve further
through assumption of enterprise liability, rather than enterprise
insurance. As the ACO would bear the burden of litigation, it would
possess not merely institutional authority, but also moral authority for
deterring errors and enforcing quality measures. This would be
particularly important, given that most ACO participants will not
provide services exclusively to ACO patients, but also to others, both
within and outside the context of the ACO. If an ACO provided only
enterprise insurance, it would possess fewer means by which to
enforce quality standards for care provided outside the ACO. . . .271
Accordingly, the HCBC – with or without operating an ACO – could and should
adopt enterprise liability for the same reasons, while simultaneously minimizing
the cost of its medical and fiduciary liability coverage by self-insuring through
its own captive.
B.

The HCBC as Health Insurer

We believe, then, that the HCBC could improve its risk management and
quality control, and reduce its insurance costs, by becoming its own enterprise
liability insurer with direct control of “underwriting, claims, and investment
decisions” while eliminating the additional cost burden of an outside commercial
carrier’s profit requirements. In like fashion, we believe that the HCBC could
271. Id. at 298–99 (emphasis added).
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similarly maintain quality, improve accessibility, and further lower costs (to its
patients, if not to itself ) by becoming a state-licensed and regulated health
insurance provider of its own non-HMO, non-capitated, indemnity plan272 –
operating essentially as a nonprofit273 Preferred Provider Organization
(“PPO”).274 As has been said, “much of what is called health insurance is
primarily the provision of administrative services: managing enrollment,
verifying eligibility, contracting with health care providers, and processing
claims”275 – all functions that the HCBC could readily accomplish.
1.

A Non-Capitated Provider/Payer

In order to best explain our concept of the HCBC serving as both provider
and payer, we need to compare and contrast an earlier proposal for “health plan
enterprise liability” with current understandings of enterprise liability for an
ACO. In his previously-cited 1997 article, Professor Sage discusses not only the
Abraham and Weiler “hospital-based model” of enterprise liability, but also the
“health plan-based model” that was proposed by President Clinton’s 1993 Task
Force on National Health Care Reform.276 In explaining the latter, Sage says:
As both a logical and a practical matter, adoption of enterprise liability
during the 1993-94 health care reform debate relied on the concurrent
passage of universal health coverage based on managed competition.
This legislatively created managed health care system would have
been composed of ‘health plans,’ that is integrated organizations that
combined health care financing with the provision of services. Health
plans might have been unitary corporations or contractual networks,
and could have been owned or controlled by any combination of
physicians, hospitals, insurers, and other health care entities.
Regardless of their structure, however, health plans would have
received a fixed annual payment, and would have been responsible for
organizing and delivering necessary care to enrollees.277

272. An “Indemnity Plan” is defined as “[a] type of medical plan that reimburses the patient and/or
provider as expenses are incurred.” Definitions of Health Insurance Terms, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB.
STAT., https://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/sp/healthterms.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2021).
273. Again, using Professor Kinney’s words, free of a commercial carrier’s competing interests in
“serving shareholders or other insureds.” Kinney, supra note 264, at 500.
274. A “Preferred Provider Organization (PPO) Plan” is defined as “[a]n indemnity plan where
coverage is provided to participants through a network of selected health care providers (such as
hospitals and physicians). The enrollees may go outside the network, but would incur larger costs in the
form of higher deductibles, higher coinsurance rates, or non-discounted charges from the providers.”
Definitions of Health Insurance Terms, U.S. BUREAU OF LAB. STAT.,
https://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/sp/healthterms.pdf (last visited Feb. 1, 2021).
275. Sage, supra note 42, at 697.
276. Sage, supra note 229, at 162–66.
277. Id. at 164 (emphasis added). Professor Sage went on to note:
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Of course, the “concurrent passage of universal health coverage based on
managed competition” that Sage described was not forthcoming – at least as then
envisioned. What happened instead was a growing disillusionment with
“managed care” generally and capitated HMOs in particular. The eventual result
was the 2010 Affordable Care Act with its promotion of Accountable Care
Organizations (ACOs) – which are not, at least for now, required to operate on a
“fixed annual payment” basis (i.e., capitation).278 As we discussed in our 2019
article:
‘The accountable care organization superficially resembles
Independent Practice Associations and Physician Hospital
Organizations, entities that sprang into being during the heyday of
managed care. The ACO is seen as having the potential to harness
some of the positive characteristics of managed care – such as a
measure of financial risk assumed by physicians, the ability to
coordinate care, and the infrastructure of an integrated delivery system
– without the negative characteristics, such as a loss of physician
autonomy, potentially harmful financial risk to physicians, or
incentives to stint on care. This is because it remains a fee-for-service
system, retaining independent proprietorships, and any financial
incentives to stint on care can be counterbalanced, or outweighed, by
incentives to improve patient outcomes.’ 279
In an environment where health care is planned, managed, and provided by a ‘system’
instead of being rendered by unaffiliated, individual practitioners, holding health plans
primarily accountable for instances of medical malpractice is appealing for three reasons.
First, health plans already would be primarily responsible for cost containment. Legal
liability for negligent health outcomes therefore should make health plans reluctant to cut
costs by reducing quality, especially when weighing aggregate budgetary concerns against
the health needs of individual patients. Second, unlike torts that involve strangers (such as
automobile accidents or toxic spills), medical malpractice arises between parties who have a
pre-existing relationship, which health plans could formalize and extend. Health plans enroll
beneficiaries using detailed insurance agreements, and rely on contractual relationships with
providers to allocate financial risk, determine the price of services, and assure costconsciousness. As a whole, these agreements could form the basis for quality improvement
activities, communication of grievances, and efficient dispute resolution. Third, health could
be subjected to significant direct regulation and oversight. In the Clinton bill, for example,
health plans were required to comply with national standards on the accessibility and
impartiality of grievance procedures; to collect, process, and publish comprehensive
information on clinical performance; and to work closely with purchasing alliances as well
as with state and federal authorities to ensure access to and quality of care.
Id. (emphasis added).
278. See Corbett, supra note 17, at 271–84, for a more complete discussion of ACOs and the
concept of Accountable Care in general.
279. Id. at 274 (emphasis added and in original) (quoting Jackson Williams, The “Shared
Accountability” Approach to Physician Payment: Four Options for Developing Accountable Care
Organizations, 7 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 85, 190 (2010)).
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Although it has been suggested that HMOs ‘are the most recognizable
ACO precursors,’ there is an important distinction between the two
models: ‘HMOs focus on the modification of reimbursement only’
(i.e., by ‘provid[ing] comprehensive health care to [voluntary
enrollees] . . . that is financed by fixed periodic payments determined
in advance’), whereas ACOs ‘address modification of both delivery
structure and reimbursement.’ Health care author Wasif Ali Khan
argues that ACOs avoid the ‘‘chicken or the egg’ conundrum,’ which
has historically ‘sidetracked and derailed’ previous efforts at
healthcare reform; that is, an ACO is a ‘healthcare delivery and costcontrol model’ that simultaneously reforms both.280
From our perspective, these differences are critical: the HCBC is a new
legal form for a clinically-integrated, institutional, direct care provider that we
propose be subject to exclusive enterprise liability for all instances of medical
negligence and/or fiduciary breach that might occur in its delivery of medical
and related health care services. The HCBC itself will be the provider-entity
properly subject to liability – not any health plan reimbursing it. That is to say,
our suggestion that the HCBC undertake to operate as a “state-licensed and
regulated health insurance provider of its own non-HMO, non-capitated,
indemnity plan – operating essentially as a nonprofit Preferred Provider
Organization (‘PPO’)” – is not to suggest that such PPO should be the locus of
enterprise liability. It is for this reason that we advocate for a variation of the
Abraham and Weiler “hospital-based model” of enterprise liability rather than
the never-pursued “health plan-based model” proposed under the Clinton
Administration.281 Our singular purpose in suggesting that the HCBC provide
an indemnity insurance product is to create more control – and thus improved
risk management and quality assurance opportunities for the organization – while
simultaneously creating an individual insurance product for its patients (and
others) that could be very cost-competitive on the ACA Insurance Exchange
(perhaps even as a private, cost-competitive alternative to a “public option”).
Liability would properly continue to reside with the HCBC as the “institutional
provider” of medical and supportive health care services.
2.

The ERISA Problem

As something of an aside, while we have no real desire to wade into the
murky morass of ERISA282 jurisprudence, we do feel obliged to acknowledge

280. Id. at 275 (emphasis added and in original) (citing Wasif Ali Khan, Accountable Care
Organizations: A Response to Critical Voices, 14 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L. 309, 310 (2012)).
281. See Abraham & Weiler, supra note 54.
282. 29 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq.
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and comment on its continuing deleterious effects on the health care delivery
system. To this end, we will point to the work of a few health law scholars who
have braved the morass with more fortitude than we possess.
As Professor P. Greg Gulick, Jr. well summarizes:
Around the time employer-based health insurance became the
predominant source of health care financing in the U.S., Congress
enacted the ERISA to address abuses in the administration and
investment of pension plan assets. The intent of ERISA was to
regulate pension plans and was not necessarily intended to regulate
health benefit plans to the extent that is has; however, non-pension
benefits, that is, health benefits, were included in this sweeping piece
of legislation. Since health benefits were part of employee benefit
plans, the federal government gained unexpected authority over health
benefit plans by virtue of changes made to ERISA. While ERISA
gives the Department of Labor and Internal Revenue Service authority
over employer-sponsored health plans (both self-funded and to a
lesser extent, fully-insured plans), this statute does not provide nearly
as many consumer protections as state laws that regulate comparable
health insurance coverage. ERISA added to the complexity of the
health care system by regulating otherwise identical health plans
differently and created the incentive for plans to self-fund, which drew
people out of the insurance risk pool. ERISA is an example of
reductionist reform. Although the stated intent of ERISA was to
address abuses of pension plans, it inadvertently created a secondary
health insurance market that impacted and influenced the way the
health care system has evolved and operates.283
Health law writer Christopher Smith succinctly explains how and why the
effect, if not the intent, of ERISA is essentially to protect Managed Care
Organizations (“MCOs”) from tort liability for adverse outcomes, leaving

283. Gulick, Jr., supra note 31, at 23 (emphasis added) (citing Amy B. Monahan, Federalism,
Regulation or Free Market? An Examination of Mandated Health Benefit Reform, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV.
1361, 1362 (2007)). The author goes on to note:
A self-funded health plan, in which employers fund the costs of health claims incurred by their
employees, can offer nearly identical benefits to fully-insured health plans, in which the
employer pays a premium for health insurance and the health insurer takes the risk (pays the
claims). However, the self-funded plan is subject to federal law (ERISA) and the fully-insured
plan is subject to state law. Although the benefits offered are nearly identical, the fully-insured
plan has to include benefits mandated by state law while the self-insured plan does not.
Id. at 23 n.135 (emphasis added).
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plaintiffs with “few, if any, remedies” except focusing “their grievances against
their physicians:”284
Ironically, even though the MCO exerts extensive control over the
physician’s treatment decision, . . . (ERISA) preempts most state law
claims against many MCOs, and therefore, the physician usually
remains solely liable for any adverse outcome. Most MCOs generally
avoid any form of liability for their coverage decisions. ERISA applies
to MCOs that are employer-sponsored health plans and preempts
state law malpractice claims against those MCOs, while also failing
to provide for a federal tort remedy against them. This is a bit of an
oversimplification of the confusing and complex liability standards
and case law governing the application of ERISA to MCO liability,
but for purposes of this article it is sufficient to note three summarizing
principles from the ERISA statute and guiding case law. First, plan
beneficiaries can bring ERISA claims in federal court for breach of
contract and collect breach of contract damages against ERISA
covered MCOs, but there are no ERISA tort claims or ERISA tort
damages to be had against ERISA covered MCOs. Second, ERISA
preempts plan beneficiaries’ state tort claims against ERISA governed
MCOs as to any claims involving eligibility decisions or
administration of benefits decisions. Lastly, ERISA preempts tort
claims founded upon MCO coverage decisions involving both
treatment and plan benefit decisions, provided the patient’s treating
physician was not involved in the utilization review decision and/or
‘the medical judgment was made by a utilization review physician
who never saw the patient.’285
Given the extent to which Americans continue to rely on “employer-sponsored
health plans,” ERISA preemption of state law medical liability claims becomes
“a nontrivial problem, since”:

284. See Smith, supra note 255, at 175–76 (noting the importance of how plaintiffs are forced to
focus their complaints against physicians rather than ERISA-compliant MCOs due to the lack of
remedies). As Professor Sage further explains:
Because of ERISA, persons injured by the conduct of managed care organizations may be
unable to bring causes of action such as wrongful death, professional negligence, intentional
infliction of emotional distress, or bad faith breach of insurance contract. If they decide to sue,
they must do so in federal court, possibly without the benefit of a jury trial. Most importantly,
their maximum potential recovery is the value of the health care benefit wrongfully denied plus
attorneys fees in many cases. Neither extracontractual compensatory nor punitive damages
may be awarded.
Sage, supra note 229, at 180.
285. Smith, supra note 255, at 175–76 (emphasis added).
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[M]any firms, especially larger ones, self-insure: in 1997, a survey of
seven states showed that employers self-insured in 13% of all firms,
56% of firms with 500 or more employees, 25% of firms with 100499 employees, and 3% of all firms with fewer than 100 employees.
A more recent study using a different methodology suggests this
number has grown significantly in our decade; self-insured plans that
escape the [state law] mandates now cover an estimated 55% of all
workers and 77% of workers in large companies.286
In our opinion, health plan coverage denials can be, and arguably have been
in many instances, tantamount to negligent violations of the medical standard of
care – for which ERISA preemption often has left meritorious claimants without
just recourse. This result is the antithesis of our aims for the HCBC – a clinically
and financially-integrated organizational provider that embraces enterprise
liability for both medical negligence and fiduciary breach, while reducing its
costs to the maximum extent possible through the elimination of outside thirdparty profits in the direct provision of health care services. As Jack K. Kilcullen
observed nearly 25 years ago:
Enterprise liability speaks loudly on the question of how to allocate
the costs of compensating injury caused by defective medical care,
much as it has incorporated itself into modern manufacturing of
goods. It provides the conceptual basis within modem economics for
the archetypically American premise that the free market will be the
primary source for meeting essential human needs. By contrast,
ERISA’s preemption of liability of health care plans, but not the
individual physician, is an outdated government incentive that
disrupts competition and robs consumers of well-established
remedies. It removes a powerful incentive to provide quality service
at a time when the government itself has failed to shoulder that
responsibility directly through a national health care program.287
V. CREATING A “CULTURE OF VIRTUE” IN INSTITUTIONAL HEALTH CARE
‘“Did you ever expect a corporation to have a conscience, when it has
no soul to be damned, and no body to be kicked?’”
Edward, 1st Baron Thurlow, Lord Chancellor of England 288

286. I. Glenn Cohen, Protecting Patients with Passports: Medical Tourism and the PatientProtective Argument, 95 IOWA L. REV. 1467, 1545 (2010) (emphasis added).
287. Kilcullen, supra note 248, at 50 (emphasis added).
288. Michael B. Metzger & Dan R. Dalton, Seeing the Elephant: An Organizational Perspective on
Corporate Moral Agency, 33 AM. BUS. L.J. 489, 541 n.5 (1996) (citing THE OXFORD DICTIONARY OF
QUOTATIONS 697 (4th ed. 1992)).
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What we seek for the HCBC is what Professor Ronald J. Colombo has
called “a corporate culture that fosters virtue.”289 In this instance, we see such
a culture as one that maintains medicine’s professional norms and commitment
to excellence, while reinforcing and sustaining a recognition of the broad scope
of fiduciary responsibility necessarily attendant to the team-delivery of health
care services. Such culture is essential, we believe, to the restoration of equity
of care and patient trust in today’s institutional health care delivery system.290
Professor Colombo explains:
‘Corporate culture is the body of shared beliefs, values, expectations,
and norms of behavior that shape life in the organization and account
for certain observable artifacts.’ Corporate culture is essential to
virtue and morality because ‘it is a vehicle for imparting and
maintaining the moral principles and the values, good and bad, that
animate life in the organization.’ Scholarship has increasingly
documented the ‘impact of organisational culture on the ethical
standards and moral practices of people in organisations.’291
As he goes on to note, “to the extent that a corporation’s focus is on
excellence – the excellence of its product and the excellence in its treatment of
its various constituencies – the corporation is fertile for the development,
growth, and exercise of virtue.”292 Professor Colombo thus urges creating “an
289. See Ronald J. Colombo, Toward a Nexus of Virtue, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 3, 69 (2012)
(emphasis added) (explaining the tremendous impact organizational culture has on the moral and ethical
standards and practices of individuals in corporations).
290. See Corbett, supra note 17, at 306–10.
291. Colombo, supra note 289, at 69–70 (emphasis added).
292. Id. at 71 (emphasis added). Professor Colombo advocates for “virtue ethics,” as derived from
Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics:
Hailing from the fourth century B.C., Nicomachean Ethics posits that “eudaimonia” (best
translated as authentic flourishing, as opposed to mere transient pleasure or satisfaction)
requires virtue as its predicate. And since Aristotle famously observed that man is a social
animal, virtue is not simply a matter of individual concern, but rather a concern of society as
a whole. As indicated, an individual’s excellence (or lack thereof) usually has repercussions
for all those around her. In the parlance of modern economics, one could say that an
individual’s private morality imposes very public externalities – indirectly if not directly.
Id. at 11–12 (citing ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS (Roger Crisp ed., Cambridge Univ. Press
2000)). Professor Colombo goes on to discuss how virtue is “developed:”
Aristotle wrote that moral virtue cannot be acquired via instruction alone but rather needed to
be developed through choice and action. Indeed, virtue has been commonly defined as the
“habit” of doing good, and habits are learned via repeated doing. This comports well with
common experience. Countless individuals know what they ought to do yet fail to actually
do it. The gulf between knowledge and willpower can be wide, and a person of virtue is
someone who has effectively bridged that gulf. To take the analogy one step further, the
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environment where the practice and development of virtue [is] actively
encouraged by the corporation.”293
The virtue that Professor Colombo exhorts, we contend, reflects the essence
of “institutional morality;” and, as we have previously said, we believe
“‘institutional morality’ is a coherent and legitimate concept – the idea that the
corporation functions as a ‘real person in society’ with corresponding obligations
to attend to the effects its presence and activities have upon a broad range of
others.”294 Moreover, as Professor Jeffrey Nesteruk observes:
[T]he corporation is an environment in which individuals make
choices and take actions and like other environments, it is not neutral
in nature. The context it creates affects the choices and actions which
occur within it, influencing their development and character. It is thus
important to consider the corporation not only as an actor, but as an
environment which structures the relationships and choices of other
actors, those individuals who work in and with the corporate
organization. In particular, the corporation affects the character of
such individuals’ ethical decision-making.295
As to corporate health care organizations (“HCOs”) specifically, we agree with
Professor Mantel:
bridge is built by repeatedly acting in accord with one’s conscience. Conversely, the bridge
is damaged each time an individual ignores the dictates of conscience and chooses instead to
act at odds with what she believes to be right.
Id. at 14.
293. Id. at 69.
294. Corbett, supra note 17, at 321. That is not to say that we subscribe to the notion of “corporate
moral personhood.” Rather, we share the view that corporations are “intentional systems and secondary
moral agents.” See Patricia H. Werhane, Corporate Moral Agency and the Responsibility to Respect
Human Rights in the UN Guiding Principles: Do Corporations Have Moral Rights, 1 BUS. HUM. RTS. J.
5, 17 (2016). As Professor Werhane explains:
[C]orporations are eliminable moral agents, because even as distinct abstract entities they do
not and cannot act independently of those who act on their behalf. Corporations, then, like
other collectives, depend on the ‘strings’ pulled by others, even though those strings appear
to be pulled by corporate missions and goals, organizational culture, a dominant logic, and
other organizationally structured phenomena that trace their origins to individual decisionmaking and behavior. . . .
. . . Rather, a corporation, particularly one of any size, is a socially-constructed non-physical
phenomenon. It cannot act on its own, but this does not diminish its collective nature and the
non-redistributable content of much of its behavior and decisions for which we hold a
corporation responsible.
Id. at 15 (emphasis added). As we stated in our 2019 article: “The real question, then, appears not to be
so much whether a corporation can have a ‘moral character of its own,” but rather whether it is inclined
to act like it does and whether such inclination depends solely on its nonprofit verses for-profit status.”
Corbett, supra note 17, at 207.
295. Jeffrey Nesteruk, Legal Persons and Moral Worlds: Ethical Choices within the Corporate
Environment, 29 AM. BUS. L. J. 75, 82 (1991).

CORBETT 05 (DO NOT DELETE)

12/23/2021 10:56 AM

2021] OPERATIONALIZING THE HEALTH CARE BENEFIT CORPORATION

337

Because HCOs are heterogeneous organizations, differences in their
organizational cultures may lead to differences in physician behavior
and, ultimately, differences in the quality, modality, and cost of care
provided to patients. Of particular concern are organizational cultures
that bias physicians’ clinical decision making in ways that lead to the
provision of inexpert or inefficient care or the withholding of
necessary care. The challenge for health scholars and policymakers,
then, is to determine how best to promote more virtuous
organizational cultures that minimize these risks while respecting
community standards of compassion and fairness.296
We believe that a properly-operationalized HCBC can help meet this challenge.
A.

The Effect of Organizational Culture

An organization’s culture manifests itself both formally and
informally. At the more visible level are an organization’s formal
structures, processes, and espoused values. These include the
organization’s financial-incentive structures, methods of performance
assessment, mission statement, and ethical guidelines. Of greater
influence, however, is an organization’s informal culture, that is, the
‘taken for granted beliefs, perceptions, thoughts and feelings.’
Together, an organization’s formal and informal culture significantly
influence its employees’ decisions, perhaps even more than the
professional norms and personal values an employee brings to the
workplace. 297
Professor Mantel argues that physicians practicing within HCOs become
subject to “an organizational dynamic that powerfully influences” their clinical
judgments.298 Through a process that “largely occurs” outside their “conscious
awareness,” they gradually adapt “to the HCO’s ‘way of doing things.’”299 In
her previously-cited 2013 article, she spends considerable time discussing the
cognitive psychology behind this process – how physicians, when inevitably
confronted with “medical uncertainty” and “difficult value trade-offs,” come to
be “guided by cognitive frameworks, or schemas, that organize their knowledge,
assumptions, and values.”300 These schemas “provide the ‘personal decision
rules’ that physicians use to make clinical decisions, particularly in conditions of

296.
297.
298.
299.
300.

Mantel, supra note 87, at 506 (emphasis added).
Id. at 485 (emphasis added)
Id.
Id. at 505.
Id. at 460 (emphasis added).
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uncertainty.”301 Professor Mantel argues that schemas thus “play a central role
in the balance physicians strike among the competing considerations in the
patient-care setting . . . enabling them to make choices in the face of uncertainty
and ambiguity.”302 She further notes the importance of this role in “directing a
physician’s cognitive processing” in the absence of “clear clinical guidelines.”303
While Professor Mantel focuses her discussion of organizational culture
and its effect on the cognitive psychology of clinical decision-making by a
HCO’s physicians, it goes without saying that the same dynamics necessarily
affect all members of the health care delivery team. To slightly modify another
quote from her:
Conceptualizing patient care as provided at the level of the individual
physician [team member], however, is a serious mistake because it
fails to recognize the link between an HCO’s organizational culture
and its affiliated physicians’ [team members’] clinical decisions. . . .
[I]t is imperative that we abandon the myth of the independent
physician and recognize that patient care increasingly is a product of
an organizational system.304
We have already discussed at length the team-delivery of health care
services by today’s institutional providers and what it implies for needed medical
tort reform. Nonetheless, it is worth here emphasizing the particular contribution
that we, like Professor Mantel, believe that adoption of enterprise liability would
make to a more equitable system of medical tort liability and a more virtuous
corporate culture:
Although proposals for enterprise medical liability are not new,
recognition of the close link between organizational culture and
patient-care decisions provides a new justification for such proposals.
Specifically, enterprise liability would recognize that organizational
norms and values may contribute to errors in physicians’ professional
judgments, such as incorrect diagnoses or selecting deficient plans of
treatment. By imposing sole legal responsibility for medical errors on
HCOs, enterprise liability would motivate HCOs to pay closer
attention to how their organizational culture may contribute to poor
medical decision[-]making by their affiliated physicians.305

301.
302.
303.
304.
305.

Id. at 477.
Id. at 484.
Id.
Id. at 505 (emphasis added).
Id. at 516–17 (emphasis added).
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Again, it goes without saying that such proposition applies to all members
of the health care team involved in the delivery of medical and supportive health
care services.
B.

The Critical Importance of a Commitment to “Mission Primacy”

A new legal paradigm is needed which would allow a
conceptualization of the corporation not as a person, but as an
organizational actor. By emphasizing the organizational character of
the corporation, this new legal framework brings into view the
corporation’s status as a moral world. Through its acknowledgment
of the corporation’s existence as a moral world, the legal theory of the
corporation can be reintegrated with practical approaches to the
corporate entity necessary to confront the ethical concerns of
corporate life which press upon us.306
We see the HCBC as offering such a “new legal framework” –
encompassing a renewed “moral world” . . .
• that is committed to the “primacy” of a “dual organizational
mission” – i.e., both the ongoing and consistent provision of
affordable, high-quality, high-value, and readily accessible health care
services and targeted profit seeking and distribution . . . ; and
• that formally recognizes and accepts its “institutional fiduciary
responsibilities” (and corresponding liability) both for the
professional provision of competent health care and for the general
accomplishment of its organizationally-mandated dual missions.307
As we explained in our 2019 article:
[U]nlike Professors Greaney and Boozang – who advocate only a
‘doctrinal recognition’ of mission primacy – we advocate that mission
primacy be made an explicit and fully-enforceable legal requirement
under the constitutive structure of the HCBC’s legal form itself. Such
requirement would limit wayward application of what has been called
the ‘best judgment rule’ – the ‘nonprofit equivalent of the business
judgment rule that allows corporate directors space in which to
exercise their discretion’ – that has too-often enabled inappropriate
nonprofit emulation of for-profit conduct. As noted by Professor
306. Nesteruk, supra note 295, at 97 (emphasis added).
307. See supra Part I.
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Henry B. Hansmann: ‘In the case of the nonprofit corporation, . . . the
purpose of the charter is primarily to protect the interests of the
organization’s patrons from those who control the corporation.’308
Simply put, we believe that something more than a “doctrinal recognition”
is necessary for the primacy of the HCBC’s “dual mission” to be sustained. The
fundamental point of the HCBC’s legally-recognized dual mission is to ensure
that the entire organization becomes and remains truly committed to the idea of
a private (i.e., non-governmental), “not-only-for-profit”309 health care delivery
system that consistently provides affordable, high-quality, high-value, and
readily accessible health care services at the lowest possible cost, while
remaining committed to “the excellence of its product and the excellence in its
treatment of its various constituencies.”310 Such commitment requires “an
organization with the right kind of culture” – one that “cultivates not simply
virtuous behavior . . . but actual virtue. Its citizens behave virtuously not because
they are rewarded for so doing and punished if they do not, but because they
value so doing and have second-order desires accordingly.”311
308. Corbett, supra note 17, at 289–90 (emphasis in original).
309. As we noted in our 2013 article:
The recognition that mission objectives other than pursuit of profit are sufficiently important
in health care to justify giving them more formalized legal status finds support in Robert G.
Evans’ concept of a “‘not-only-for-profit’ sector” – a designation referring to “firms ‘in which
a legal claimant to profits is well-defined, but profits represent only one among several
competing objectives of the firm’s ownership and management.’
Corbett, supra note 3, at 167 (citing Theodore R. Marmor et al., A New Look at Nonprofits:
Health Care Policy in a Competitive Age, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 313, 319 (1986) (emphasis added)).
310. See supra Part V.
311. Metzger & Dalton, supra note 288, at 541 n.331 (emphasis added) (quoting Edwin M. Hartman,
The Commons and the Moral Organization, 4 BUS. ETHICS Q. 253, 258 (1994)). Professor Susanna K.
Ripken further elaborates on the concept of second order desires:
In organizations with strong corporate cultures, the culture is integrated into the lives of the
members and it becomes difficult to see oneself apart from it. There are psychological and
sociological dimensions to this integration: ‘[G]roups are not only external features of the
world that people encounter and interact with, . . . they are also internalized so that they
contribute to a person’s sense of self. Groups define who we are, what we see, what we think
and what we do.’ People naturally develop a sense of loyalty to groups, identifying with the
goals and values of the group and making them their own. Strong cultures can actually help
determine what makes one happy and what kind of person one wants to be, in part, by defining
for the person what counts as success. In Frankfurtian terms, cultures can affect one’s secondorder desires, causing one not only to want certain things, but also to want to want them, i.e.,
to desire to be the type of person who values these things. . . .
Susanna K. Ripken, Corporations Are People Too: A Multi-Dimensional Approach to the Corporate
Personhood Puzzle, 15 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 97, 134–35 (2009) (emphasis in original and
added). She goes on to note: “Harry Frankfurt’s well-known philosophical theory of the concept of the
person posits that having freedom of will is essential to being a person, and that one has this freedom of
will only when one can have the will one wants to have, i.e., the capacity for second-order desires.” Id.
at 135 n.139 (emphasis added) (citing Harry G. Frankfurt, Freedom of the Will and the Concept of a
Person, 68 J. PHIL. 5, 5–20 (1971)).
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VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
‘The failure of most [integrated delivery systems] to provide greater
value over the past 15 years has been due to their over-emphasis on
achieving functional and economic integration to the neglect of the
clinical integration process. . . . [T]these new organizations ‘failed to
fulfill their potential because the main driver was to create a structure
rather than to develop objectives or the desired outcome of
integration.’ . . .’312
...
[T]he push toward vertically integrated systems in the 1990s ‘did not
create the desired social-psychological change: Despite being
nominally part of the same organization, physicians and hospitals
continued to see themselves as separate groups with divergent
interests, values, and worldviews;’ . . . research from the 1990s . . .
found that ‘membership in PHOs and IPAs had little effect on
physicians’ identification or commitment’ to integrated delivery
networks.313
We will end where we began – with our five objectives for operationalizing
the HCBC. The first objective was the HCBC’s adoption of an integrated
systems approach to facilitate care coordination and the development and
appropriate use of evidence-based clinical practice guidelines. Enough has
already been said about the implications of today’s team-provided health care
and the importance of HIT and data analytics in improving communication and
care coordination. As to evidence-based medicine, we have directly stated that
“the HCBC is well structured to develop its own CPGs, to indemnify its
physicians and staff for following them, and to assume legal accountability for
outcomes through acceptance of enterprise liability.”314 Such CPGs would be
developed under the auspices of the HCBC by the very health care teams who
would be responsible for implementing and following them, reflecting their
consensus view of the clinically-best and most cost-effective practices available.
As such, these CPGs should not be met by the kind of professional resistance
that historically has confronted many third-party- and even governmentdeveloped guidelines. The CPGs themselves will not be deemed to establish the
definitive “standard of care” in any legal proceeding, but rather only to be
relevant evidence of such standard315 – reflecting the HCBC’s best judgment of
best practices. Accordingly, those health team members following the CPGs will
312.
313.
314.
315.

Mantel, supra note 87, at 465 n.31 (internal cites omitted, emphasis added).
Id. at 466 n.34 (internal cites omitted, emphasis added).
See supra Part III Section A.1.a.
As currently remains the case in most jurisdictions. See supra Part III Section A.1.a.
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in all cases be “immunized” or “indemnified” by the HCBC against any finding
of individual liability (except for demonstrated instances of willful misconduct
or gross negligence) through the HCBC’s adoption of exclusive medical
enterprise liability as herein discussed.316 Should any care or treatment
consistent with any such CPG be found negligent in any proceeding (i.e.,
violative of the applicable standard of care), then liability for such negligence
shall reside solely with the HCBC itself. Similarly, should any act or omission
not covered by a CPG be alleged to violate the standard of care – and result in
harm – then any claim resulting from such occurrence will be treated as an
exclusive enterprise medical liability claim against the HCBC (with the same,
hopefully rare, exceptions for individual liability). In sum, the HCBC shall
assume the risk that its CPGs meet the applicable standard of care for medical
malpractice; if no CPG covers the situation, the HCBC shall indemnify its health
team members in all cases excepting willful misconduct or gross negligence.
The second objective was to enhance fairness and equity for victims of
“iatrogenic injury” by adopting an alternative theory of tort liability to govern
the medical and fiduciary duties and liabilities of integrated system providers.
To this end, we have now explained the rationale for the HCBC to operate under
a construct of exclusive enterprise medical liability that encompasses a broader
range of fiduciary obligations owed by all organizational participants in the direct
provision of health care services.317 We have described in some detail how the
EML construct here proposed: differs from others’ understandings of the “tort
theory of enterprise liability” in different contexts; builds upon a policy proposal
first advanced in the late 1980s by two prominent academics; and, continues to
garner considerable support among health law scholars.318 In contrast to
prevailing tort reform efforts to date – which almost universally limit plaintiffs’
damages and/or erect further barriers to claim adjudication – the EML construct
here proposed for the HCBC directly addresses the thorny issues of “defendant
indeterminancy” and “proximate causation” that have too often thwarted
meritorious plaintiff claims, particularly in today’s team-delivered health care
environment.319 While critics may protest that such an approach may well result
316. See supra notes 264–267 and accompanying text. Should there be a case, however, in which an
individual team member willfully failed to follow an applicable HCBC-CPG, or was otherwise grossly
negligent in relation thereto, and harm resulted – then the HCBC’s indemnification would not apply and
that individual would be subject to an individual finding of negligence for which they would be
individually liable. See Kinney, supra note 264, at 502–03 (discussing the problems for meaningful
health care reform created by NPDB reporting requirements and questioning the continuing value of
such reporting). It is only in such instances that the HCBC would report that individual to the National
Practitioner Data Bank. Id. at 503.
317. See supra Part III.
318. See supra note 261 and accompanying text.
319. To again quote Professor Furrow:
Complexity in medicine – the combination of medical progress and industrialization – is
producing more medical adverse events and errors than ever before. Mark Chassin and Jerod
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in more malpractice litigation, we would respond: (1) historically (and still), the
incidence rate of medical injury far exceeds the number of malpractice claims
filed, which in turn far exceeds the percentage of claims receiving
compensation;320 (2) the HCBC is committed to the primacy of a dual
organizational mission which includes “the ongoing and consistent provision of
affordable, high-quality, high-value, and readily accessible health care services,”
together with limited profit seeking321 – not the minimization of costs associated
with compensating those whom it wrongfully injures; (3) the HCBC’s adoption
of enterprise medical liability, together with development and use of its own
professionally-acceptable CPGs, should go a long way toward improving its
quality assurance and risk management efforts and corresponding liability
claims experience; and (4) (as will be discussed next), the HCBC will make
significant reductions in the overhead cost of its liability coverage and payouts
by self-insuring via its own captive.
Loeb observe: ‘Hospitals house patients who are increasingly vulnerable to harm due to error,
and the complexity of the care hospitals now provide increases the likelihood of those errors.’
A study of a large Chicago-area hospital concluded that the Harvard study, the bedrock for the
data projections in To Err Is Human, underestimated the incidence of injuries by a significant
percentage. Drugs continue to be a source of patient harm. Furthermore, studies of medical
practice variation conclude that many physicians practice in ways that endanger patients, in
spite of clear practice guidelines to the contrary. This complexity – the combination of
medical progress and industrialization – is producing more medical adverse events and errors,
with new studies concluding that the frequency of patient injury continues to grow. In spite of
this growing evidence of patient injury, in no other area of civil law has reform pushed so
aggressively against the tool of litigation on behalf of injured plaintiffs, even with evidence of
substantial underclaiming by patients who suffer adverse events.
Barry R. Furrow, The Patient Injury Epidemic: Medical Malpractice Litigation as a Curative Tool, 4
DREXEL L. REV. 41, 46–47 (2011) (emphasis added) (citing Lori B. Andrews et al., An Alternative
Strategy for Studying Adverse Events in Medical Care, 349 LANCET 309, (1997) (“Although 17.7% of
patients experienced serious events that led to longer hospital stays and increased costs to the patients,
only 1.2% of the 1047 patients made claims for compensation.”)).
320. As Jane Elaine Ballerini has observed:
Every year, ‘about 15 malpractice claims are filed for every 100 physicians, and about 30
percent of those claims result in an insurance payment.’ Of over 35 million annual
hospitalizations across the country, there are 350,000 medical injuries, of which 10,000 are
serious and permanent disabilities and another 75,000 are fatal. Only about 55,000 lawsuits
result from these injuries, with an even smaller amount, 15,000, producing any payments
through settlements or jury awards.
...
While there is conflicting data about the types and causes of medical errors, the medical
malpractice litigation system consistently fails to compensate the majority of patients who are
injured in the course of receiving medical care. For decades, the number of lawsuits filed has
not come fractionally close to the number of injuries sustained from medical errors.
Ballerini, supra note 211 at 364–65 (emphasis added) (citing Catherine T. Struve, Doctors, the
Adversary System, and Procedural Reform in Medical Liability Litigation, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 943,
976 (2004) (“[T]he Harvard Medical Practice Study estimated that some 27,000 hospital patients in New
York State in 1984 were injured as a result of negligent medical care, but that fewer than 3,800 patients
asserted malpractice claims – a substantial ‘gap’ between potential and actual claims.”)).
321. See supra Part I.
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The third objective was to significantly reduce the overhead costs of
insurance coverage for the HCBC’s prospective medical and fiduciary liabilities.
This will be directly accomplished by eliminating use of profit-making, thirdparty, commercial liability insurance in favor of self-insurance through the
HCBC’s own “captive” operating on a nonprofit basis. 322 Combined with the
acceptance of enterprise medical liability, such step will have several cost-saving
consequences: the cost of coverage to the HCBC will be significantly reduced by
eliminating the profit overhead necessarily imbedded in the premium pricing of
third-party commercial carriers; self-insurance will eliminate the price
vicissitudes of the commercial market’s “insurance cycle,” which often result in
premium increases totally unrelated to any individual insured’s claims
experience; and, since the HCBC will be the only entity insured by its captive, it
will be “able to direct all underwriting, claims, and investment decisions” free
“of a commercial carrier’s competing interests in serving shareholders or other
insureds.”323 Finally, the HCBC will be able to direct the policies of its captive
in ways that will facilitate risk management activities and possible settlement
programs that could identify and resolve prospective claims before they are
brought.324
The fourth objective was for the HCBC to essentially become a payer to
itself by offering a more cost-efficient, market-competitive private insurance
option to interested enrollees. It would do this by “by becoming a state-licensed
and regulated health insurance provider of its own non-HMO, non-capitated,
indemnity plan – operating essentially as a nonprofit Preferred Provider
Organization (“PPO”).”325 Just as we believe that becoming its own liability
insurer would enhance the HCBC’s risk management and quality assurance
activities while simultaneously reducing costs, so we believe that offering a
lower-cost indemnity plan alternative would redound to the HCBC’s benefit by
attracting new patients through its provision of a more affordable “private” (i.e.,

322. “Captives are of interest to all industries because they allow corporate control over the captive;
reduce premiums that do not [sic] reflect profits for commercial insurers or expenses related to any other
non-associated risk; and, for for-profit corporations, permit tax deductions for premiums paid to the
captive.” See Kinney, supra note 264, at 497. Note that there appears to be a typographical or “double
negative” error in the text: it would seem that the language should read something like “reduce
premiums such that they not reflect profits for commercial insurers or expenses related to any other nonassociated risk . . . .” Id.
323. See supra Part IV Section A.1.
324. What Professor Hermer notes about ACOs is equally true for the HCBC:
Insuring via a captive or via self-insurance permits a parent to direct the policies of the captive.
This is particularly relevant for ACOs in the context of medical malpractice insurance. If an
ACO wanted to employ a disclosure and offer program, . . . it could direct its captive to do so.
It could additionally coordinate research on medical errors and quality improvement programs.
Captives that do such things and more already exist. . . .
Hermer, supra note 95, at 298.
325. See supra Part IV. Section B.
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non-governmental) health insurance option. That is, since such option could be
“priced” by the HCBC “at cost” to the enrollee without the additional “profit”
requirements of a commercial carrier, it might well offer quality competition to
employer-sponsored plans with all of their attendant ERISA complications and
potential problems.326
The fifth and final objective was to restore patient trust in institutional health
care providers by creating and sustaining an organizational “culture of virtue.”
This can be accomplished in two basic ways: first, by consciously focusing on,
shaping, and promoting a “formal” and “informal” organizational culture within
the HCBC that values – above all else – “medicine’s professional norms and
commitment to excellence, while reinforcing and sustaining a recognition of the
broad scope of fiduciary responsibility necessarily attendant to the team-delivery
of health care services;”327 second, by legally-mandating adherence to the
primacy of the HCBC’s dual organizational mission, with its principal emphasis
on “the ongoing and consistent provision of affordable, high-quality, high-value,
and readily accessible health care services.”328 As we have previously noted, in
2009 Pope Benedict XVI called for “a broad new composite reality embracing
the public and private spheres, one which does not exclude profit, but instead
considers it a means for achieving human and social ends”329 – perhaps, with the
“right kind of culture,” the HCBC will bring it about in today’s institutional
health care delivery system.

326. See supra Part IV. Section B.2.
327. See supra Part V.
328. That is to say, a dual mission where “[p]ursuit of ‘profit’ – in the sense of residual revenue over
expenses necessary to meet ongoing capital needs for replacement and growth – would necessarily
remain, but as a secondary rather than sole or even primary objective.” Corbett, supra note 17, at 288.
329. Id. at 207.

